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I. Introduction
The California Attorney General’s office
acknowledges “that 20 percent of all notices of
intent to sue under [the Safe Drinking Water
and Toxic Enforcement Act of 1986] are frivo-
lous.”1 Furthermore, the office believes private
enforcers target small businesses. “The prob-
lem is that if you’re a small business, the pres-
sure is on you to settle. You don’t have the
luxury of acting as a crusader against frivolous
suits. The pressure is on you to meet a pay-
roll.”2 However, the California Attorney
General’s office remains impotent to eliminate
frivolous lawsuits.3 The Consumer Product
Safety Commission could empower the
Attorney General’s office to eliminate these
suits by harmonizing “Prop. 65,” California’s
labeling horse, with the Federal Hazardous
Substances Act, the federal labeling barn.
In 1986, the citizens of California approved
the Safe Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement
Act of 1986.4 Commonly known as “Prop. 65,”
the statute generally requires warnings for
environmental, consumer and occupational
exposure to particular chemicals.5 In June
1997, the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (“OSHA”) limited Prop. 65’s
requirements for work place exposure to
California manufacturers.6 OSHA’s ruling
expressly excluded “consumer products.”7 In
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1. Jack McCarthy, Toxic Showdown, THE PRESS-ENTERPRISE
(Riverside, Cal.), Feb. 16, 1998, at A1.
2. Id.
3. See id. In 1996, the California Attorney General’s office
“sought legislation that would give it oversight of Prop. 65 cases
and authority to screen any deemed frivolous. The measure
failed to get the two-thirds majority required to reconsider an ini-
tiative.” Id.
4. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25249.5-.13 (West 2000).
5. See id.
6. See Supplement to California Plan, 62 Fed. Reg. 31159
(June 6, 1997).
7. See id. “Proposition 65 also is applicable to non-occu-
pational (i.e. consumer and environmental) exposures. OSHA
has no authority to address Proposition 65’s non-occupational
applications; consequently, they are not at issue in this decision
and will be unaffected by it.” Id.
1992 and 1997, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals and the California Court of Appeal
rejected industry arguments that the Federal
Hazardous Substances Act (“FHSA”) preempts
Prop. 65.8
This article concludes the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals and the California Court of
Appeal erred. First, the article reviews the
statutes and their purposes. Second, the arti-
cle reviews key Supreme Court decisions and
their implementation by California courts.
Finally, the article suggests a method by which
the Consumer Product Safety Commission
(“CPSC”), by exercising its congressionally
mandated power, can clarify Congress’s intent
to preempt “right-to-know” statutes such as
Prop. 65, and harmonize Prop. 65 with the
FHSA.
II. The Statutes
A. The Federal Hazardous Substances Act.
Congress has designed various “labeling”
statutes to protect consumers by requiring
producers to label their products in a specific
manner.9 In 1960, Congress recognized
advancements in the field of applied chemistry
necessitated specific legislation for household
consumer products.
At the time of passage of the Federal
Caustic Poison Act in 1927 the number
of household chemical compounds in
use was extremely limited. The act
called for the labeling of only 12 caus-
tic and corrosive alkalis and acids.
Other laws—the Federal Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act and the Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide, and Roden-
ticide Act—include requirements for
certain descriptive labeling, but, in the
aggregate, the scope of these acts is
not sufficient today. There are numer-
ous hazardous chemicals used in the
household which are not subject to any
of the above-mentioned laws.10
Moreover, annual statistics demonstrated
that inadequate labeling harmed children.
The U.S. Public Health Service esti-
mates that every year some 600,000
children swallow household acids and
that about 500 children die each year
as a result of such accidents. In addi-
tion, many adults are injured or killed
each year by household substances
that do not bear adequate cautionary
labels. 
For example, a number of house-
hold silver polishes contain deadly
cyanide, and over the years a number
of deaths have been caused by the
ingestion of such polish by children. A
number of household dry cleaning
preparations contain carbon tetrachlo-
ride, a potent liver poison that may
cause serious injury or even death if
used without adequate ventilation.
Numerous other chemicals not cov-
ered by the Federal Caustic Poison Act
are capable of causing, and have
caused, tragic accidents, when used in
the home improperly. The bill is
intended to require a cautionary label-
ing of such hazardous articles, to pro-
vide householders and their families
with adequate instructions for safe use
of the materials, and to provide when
necessary, adequate first-aid instruc-
tions for treatment of such injuries as
occur.11
Congress determined that federal legisla-
tion requiring labeling would minimize these
tragedies. Congress enacted the Federal
Hazardous Substances Act (“FHSA”) to
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8. See Chemical Specialties Mfrs. Ass’n v. Allenby, 958 F.2d
941 (9th Cir. 1992); People ex rel. Lungren v. Cotter & Co., 62 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 368 (1997).
9. See, e.g., Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide
Act (FIFRA), 7 U.S.C. § 136(p)(2) (2000); Poison Prevention
Packaging Act of 1970 (PPPIA), 15 U.S.C. § 5 1471(5) (2000);
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), 21 U.S.C. § 321(m)
(2000); Poultry and Poultry Products Inspection Act, 21 U.S.C. §
453(s) (2000); Meat Inspection Act, 21 U.S.C. § 601(p) (2000).
10. H.R. REP. NO. 1861 (1960), reprinted in 1960 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2833, 2834-35.
11. Id.
provide for nationally uniform require-
ments for adequate cautionary labeling
of hazardous substances which are
sold in interstate commerce and are
intended or suitable for household
use. . . .
. . . .
. . . This bill covers substances
which are toxicants, corrosives, irri-
tants, strong sensitizers, flammable,
and also substances which generate
pressure. It also covers any radioactive
substance (other than those men-
tioned below) if, with respect to such
substance as used in a particular class
of article or as packaged, the Secretary
of Health, Education, and Welfare
determines by regulation that it is suf-
ficiently hazardous to require labeling
in order to protect the public health.
The Secretary also may, by regulation,
declare to be a hazardous substance
any substance which he finds meets
the requirements of the basic defini-
tion of this term in the bill, if such
action would promote the objectives of
this legislation by avoiding or resolving
uncertainty as to its application.
Excluded from the proposed legis-
lation are economic poisons subject to
the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and
Rodenticide Act and food, drugs, and
cosmetics subject to the Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act (which for pur-
poses of cautionary labeling would
remain subject to the provisions of the
Federal Caustic Poison Act), sub-
stances intended for use as fuels when
stored in containers and used in the
heating, cooking, or refrigeration sys-
tem of a house, and any source materi-
al, special nuclear material, or by-prod-
uct material as defined in the Atomic
Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and
regulations pursuant thereto by the
Atomic Energy Commission.12
In passing the FHSA, Congress recognized
uniform labeling benefits both children and
adults:
The nationwide uniformity in the label-
ing of potentially hazardous chemicals
would be advantageous to everybody.
Such a labeling program would facili-
tate the education of the public in the
cautionary use of these products.
Informative, uniform labeling would
enable physicians to administer anti-
dotes immediately rather than waste
precious time in determining the active
ingredients of the products.13
Absent federal legislation, Congress feared
states would enact their own labeling statutes,
“leading to a multiplicity of requirements and
creating unnecessary confusion in labeling, to
the detriment of the public.”14 For example,
multiple state warning requirements, as
Congress noted concerning minor hazard
warning requirements, would create a situation
where
hardly. . . any substance going into the
household . . . would not have to bear
cautionary labeling, so that consumers
would tend more and more to disre-
gard label warnings, thus inviting indif-
ference to cautionary statements on
packages of substances presenting a
real hazard of substantial injury or ill-
ness.15
The FHSA requires a label for “haz-
ardous substances”16—“including a toy, or
other article intended for use by children,
which is a hazardous substance, or which bears
or contains a hazardous substance in such
manner as to be susceptible of access by a
child to whom such toy or other article is
entrusted” that is packaged to be used in a
household or by a child—to contain the fol-
lowing information:
21
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12. Id. at 2833-34.
13. Id. at 2835.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 2837.
16. See 15 U.S.C. § 1261(f) (defining hazardous substance).
(1) (A) the name and place of business
of the manufacturer, packer, distributor
or seller; (B) the common or usual
name or the chemical name (if there be
no common or usual name) of the haz-
ardous substance or of each compo-
nent which contributes substantially to
its hazard, unless the Commission by
regulation permits or requires the use
of a recognized generic name; (C) the
signal word “DANGER” on substances
which are extremely flammable, corro-
sive, or highly toxic; (D) the signal word
“WARNING” or “CAUTION” on all other
hazardous substances; (E) an affirma-
tive statement of the principal hazard
or hazards, such as “Flammable,”
“Combustible,” “Vapor Harmful,”
“Causes Burns,” “Absorbed Through
Skin,” or similar wording descriptive of
the hazard; (F) precautionary measures
describing the action to be followed or
avoided, except when modified by reg-
ulation of the Commission pursuant to
section 1262 of this title; (G) instruc-
tion, when necessary or appropriate,
for first-aid treatment; (H) the word
“poison” for any hazardous substance
which is defined as “highly toxic” by
subsection (h) of this section; (I)
instructions for handling and storage
of packages which require special care
in handling or storage; and (J) the
statement (i) “Keep out of the reach of
children” or its practical equivalent, or
(ii) if the article is intended for use by
children and not a banned hazardous
substance, adequate directions for the
protection of children from the hazard.17
Congress patterned the FHSA, including its
definitions, after its companion statute, the
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act.18 The FHSA
defines “label” to mean
a display of written, printed, or graphic
matter upon the immediate container
of any substance or, in the case of an
article which is unpackaged or is not
packaged in an immediate container
intended or suitable for delivery to the
ultimate consumer, a display of such
matter directly upon the article
involved or upon a tag or other suit-
able material affixed thereto.19
Congress also imposes additional require-
ments:
a requirement made by or under
authority of this chapter that any word,
statement, or other information appear
on the label shall not be considered to
comply with unless such word, state-
ment, or other information also
appears (1) on the outside container or
wrapper, if any there be, unless it is
easily legible through the outside con-
tainer or wrapper and (2) on all accom-
panying literature where there are
directions for use, written or otherwise.20
Although Congress did not define “label-
ing” in the FHSA, it vested the FHSA’s regulato-
ry body with “[t]he authority to promulgate reg-
ulations for the efficient enforcement of this
chapter.”21 Exercising this authority, the FHSA
regulatory bodies define necessary terms.
As originally drafted, the FHSA did not
expressly preempt state labeling requirements.
However, the FHSA’s legislative history demon-
strates a clear intent to preempt state labeling
requirements.22 In 1966, Congress amended the
FHSA to formally recognize the statute’s
preemptive effect.23 Moreover, the FHSA’s
original regulatory body, the Food and Drug
22
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17. 5 U.S.C. § 1261.
18. See H.R. REP. NO. 1861, supra note 11, at 2839.
19. 15 U.S.C. § 1261(n). “‘Label’ is defined, as in the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, as a display of written,
printed, or graphic matter upon the immediate container of any
substance.” H.R. REP. NO. 1861, supra note 11, at 2839.
20. H.R. REP. NO. 1861, supra note 11, at 2839.
21. 15 U.S.C. § 1269(a). Originally, the Food and Drug
Administration, through the Secretary of Health, Education, and
Welfare, presided over the FHSA. Congress subsequently trans-
ferred the regulatory authority to the Consumer Product Safety
Commission (“CPSC”). See 15 U.S.C. § 2079(a).
22. See H.R. REP. NO. 1861, supra note 11.
23. 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1521, 1524.
Administration (“FDA”), recognized Congress’s
preemptive intent and, exercising its regulato-
ry authority, drafted the necessary regulation.24
The FDA also defined “precautionary labeling”
in the regulation as labeling that includes such
information as warnings, registration or identi-
fication numbers, disclosure of hazards, anti-
dote information, ingredient statements, and
other similar labeling requirements.25 When
Congress transferred regulatory authority to
the Consumer Product Safety Commission
(“CPSC”), CPSC also promulgated a “preemp-
tion” regulation26 and adopted the FDA’s “pre-
cautionary labeling” definition.27
In 1976, Congress amended the FHSA to
reflect CPSC’s preemption regulation: 
With regard to the Federal Hazardous
Substances Act, that legislation does
not contain a preemption clause appli-
cable to regulations used to determine
when a hazardous substance or article
shall be a banned hazardous substance
or article. While the promulgation of
such standards under the Hazardous
Substances Act will assist manufactur-
ers in complying with the Act and will
assist the Commission in enforcing its
provisions, the Committee action will
clarify the preemptive effect of these
regulations.28
The FHSA preemption clause provides:
(b)(1)(A) Except as provided in para-
graphs (2) and (3), if a hazardous sub-
stance or its packaging is subject to a
cautionary labeling requirement under
section 2(p) or 3(b) designed to protect
against a risk of illness or injury asso-
ciated with the substance, no State or
political subdivision of a State may
establish or continue in effect a caution-
ary labeling requirement applicable to
such substance or packaging and
designed to protect against the same
risk of illness or injury unless such cau-
tionary labeling requirement is identical
to the labeling requirement under sec-
tion 2(p) or 3(b).29
Congress’s 1976 amendment limited the
FHSA’s preemptive effect, but it did not elimi-
nate the FHSA’s preemptive authority.30
Therefore, CPSC revoked its preemption regu-
lation:
In May 1976 Congress amended the
FHSA preemption provision, section
18(b). . . . The regulation that imple-
mented the 1966 version . . . became
incompatible with the new statutory
provision. Therefore, the Commission
is now revoking this regulation. . . .
23
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24. “Federal preemption applies both to household sub-
stances and articles required to be labeled in accordance with the
act, and to household substances and articles not required to be
labeled in accordance with the act because they are not ‘haz-
ardous substances’ as defined in section 2(f) of the act or because
they have been exempt from labeling pursuant to a regulation
promulgated by the Commissioner. Federal preemption applies
to any nonuniform labeling requirements, regardless of whether
it conflicts with or is incompatible with the Federal requirement.”
37 Fed. Reg. 18,628, 18,629 (1972).
25. Id.
26. See 16 C.F.R. § 1500.7(b). “Federal preemption applies
(1) to household substances and articles required to be labeled
in accordance with the act and (2) to household substances and
articles not required to be labeled in accordance with the act
because they (i) are not ‘hazardous substances’ as defined by sec-
tion 2(f) of the act (repeated in section 1500.3(b)(4)) or (ii) are
exempt from labeling under a regulation promulgated by the
Commission. Federal preemption applies to any nonuniform
labeling requirement, regardless of whether it conflicts with or is
incompatible with the Federal Requirement.” 38 Fed. Reg. 27,012,
27,016 (1973).
27. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
28. 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1003.
29. Consumer Product Safety Commission Improvements
Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-284, § 17, 90 Stat. 510 (1976) (empha-
sis added).  Sections 2(p) (15 U.S.C. Sec. 1261(p)) and 3(b) (15
U.S.C. Sec. 1262(b)) dictate label and labeling’s content.
30. “The original FHSA ‘limited preemption amendment,’
adopted in 1966, declared Congress’s intent to ‘supersede any
and all laws of the States . . . insofar as they may . . . provide for
cautionary labeling of any substance or article intended for
household use . . . which differs from the requirements or exemp-
tions of this Act.’ In 1976, Congress amended the provision and
limited preemption to instances where there is a federal labeling
requirement in effect and a State imposes a different labeling
requirement that seeks to warn about the same hazards.”
Chemical Specialties Mfrs. Ass’n v. Allenby, 744 F. Supp. 934, 937
n.4 (N.D. Cal. 1990), aff’d, 958 F.2d 941 (9th Cir. 1992).
[T]he Commission finds that a notice
and comment rulemaking procedure is
unnecessary because the statutory basis
of the existing FHSA preemption regulation no
longer exists.31
However, CPSC simultaneously revoked its
“precautionary labeling” definition.32 Therefore,
“precautionary labeling” or its nomenclature
“cautionary labeling” remains undefined.
B. Proposition 65.
In December 1984, a Union Carbide plant
producing pesticides released methyl iso-
cyanate, a toxic gas, near Bhopal, India, killing
and injuring thousands.33 In response, federal
and state governments enacted “right-to-know”
statutes.34 Typically, these statutes require an
administrative authority, such as the
Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”), to
identify and publish a list of “extremely haz-
ardous substances.”35 A facility releasing cer-
tain quantities of the substances must warn
various agencies of the release.36
In 1986, California voters approved their
own “right-to-know” statute. The purpose of
the Safe Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement
Act of 1986 (“Prop. 65”) was “to identify chemi-
cals known to cause cancer or birth defects,
and to prevent exposure to those chemicals
through our water supplies, in the workplace,
and by other means.”37 Prop. 65 mimics many
features found in “right-to-know” statutes. For
example, it requires the Governor “to publish a
list of those chemicals known to the state to
cause cancer or reproductive toxicity. . . and
cause such list to be revised in light of addi-
tional knowledge at least once per year there-
after.”38 Furthermore, Prop. 65 also contains a
warning provision. Prop. 65 provides that
no person in the course of doing busi-
ness shall knowingly and intentionally
expose any individual to a chemical
known to the state to cause cancer or
reproductive toxicity without first giv-
ing clear and reasonable warning to
such individual.39
Prop. 65 fails to define “warning,” but
explains:
“warning” within the meaning of
Section 25249.6 need not be provided
separately to each exposed individual
and may be provided by general meth-
ods such as labels on consumer prod-
ucts, inclusion of notices in mailings to
water customers, posting of notices,
placing notices in public news media,
and the like, provided the warning
accomplished is clear and reason-
able.40
This emulates the Emergency Planning and
Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986, which
requires the owner or operator of a facility that
releases a listed substance to notify the public
“by such means as telephone, radio, or in per-
son.”41 Prop. 65 also contains a citizen enforce-
ment provision. This provision states that
24
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31. 47 Fed. Reg. 57,489 (1982) (emphasis added).
32. See id.
33. See Anniversaries, THE TIMES (London), Dec. 3, 1997
(“More than 3,000 people were killed as a result of a chemical
spillage at the Union Carbide pesticide factory in Bhopal, India,
[December, 1984.”).
34. See, e.g., Emergency Planning and Community Right-
to-Know Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1101–05 (2000). The “Right-to-
Know” “provisions were developed in large part as a result of the
terrible disaster in Bhopal, India, at which deadly fumes of
methyl isocyanate, a pesticide, intermediate, were released acci-
dentally into a sleeping community, resulting in death or injury to
thousands of people.” 132 CONG. REC. 14,895 (1986). 
35. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 11002 (2000).
36. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 11004 (2000).
37. Nicolle-Wagner v. Deukmejian, 230 Cal. App. 3d 652,
655 (1991).
38. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25249.8 (West 2000).
39. Id. § 25249.6 (emphasis added). The statute also
exempts persons employing fewer than ten persons. See id. §
25249.11(b).
40. Id. § 25249.11(f). See also Chemical Specialties Mfrs.
Ass’n v. Allenby, 958 F.2d 941, 944 (9th Cir. 1992); People ex rel.
Lungren v. Cotter & Co., 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d 368, 377 (1997).
Furthermore, Prop. 65’s regulations “describe four types of ‘safe
harbor’ warnings for consumer products: product labeling, ‘shelf
labeling, signs, menus, or a combination thereof.’” Cotter, 62 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 372 (citing CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 22, § 12601(b)(1)(B)).
41. 42 U.S.C. § 11004(b).
[a]ctions pursuant to this section may
be brought by any person in the public
interest if (1) the action is commenced
more than sixty days after the person
has given notice of the violation which
is the subject of the action to the
Attorney General and the district attor-
ney and any city attorney in whose
jurisdiction the violation is alleged to
occur and to the alleged violator, and
(2) neither the Attorney General nor
any district attorney nor any city attor-
ney or prosecutor has commenced and
is diligently prosecuting an action
against such violation.42
Since June 1997—when OSHA ruled that
Prop. 65 does not apply to manufacturers out-
side of California—the California Attorney
General has received more than 500 pages of
Prop. 65-required 60-day notices.43 From this
list, it appears that Prop. 65 “bounty hunters,”
i.e., private enforcers, prey upon out of state
companies.
III. The California Courts Avoid Preemption
Subsequent to Prop. 65’s enactment, vari-
ous industries claimed federal statutes pre-
empted Prop. 65’s requirements.44 In People ex
rel. Lungren v. Cotter and Company45 and Chemical
Specialties Manufacturers Association v. Allenby,46 the
courts rejected industry claims that the FHSA
preempts Prop. 65’s labeling requirements. 
In Chemical Specialties, plaintiff Chemical
Specialties Manufacturers Association, Inc.
(“CSMA”), filed a declaratory judgment action
seeking a ruling that the FHSA preempted
Prop. 65.47 CSMA argued Prop. 65 frustrates
Congress’s purpose for passing the FHSA, i.e.,
to set nationwide uniformity in labeling of
potentially hazardous chemicals.48
Furthermore, CSMA argued the FHSA pre-
empts “all state mandated precautionary label-
ing that is not identical” to the FHSA’s require-
ments.49 The court, however, held Prop. 65 com-
plemented, rather than contradicted, the FHSA
warnings: “A retail outlet can comply with
Proposition 65 by posting a sign in a visible
place specifying the products that are known to
the state to cause cancer or that are reproduc-
tive toxic.”50 This is known as a “point-of-sale”
warning.51
The court held three reasons precluded the
FHSA from preempting Prop. 65. First, the
court defined “cautionary labeling” to include
“directions for use”; however, Prop. 65’s “point-
of-sale” warnings contained no “directions for
use.”52 The point-of-sale warnings do not
tell you whether it’s going to cause
defects if you pour it on your feet, or if
you drink it, or if you poke it in your ear,
it just says that it may cause birth
defects. How is that a direction for
use?53
Second, the court held Prop. 65 warnings
are not identical as required by the FHSA’s pre-
emption clause:
FHSA does not require any specific lan-
guage in its warnings. The Act merely
requires (1) that labels contain the sig-
nal word “WARNING” or “CAUTION”
and (2) words which describe the
potential hazard. Consequently, a mes-
sage such as the following could com-
ply with both Proposition 65 and the
FHSA: “Warning, this product contains
25
W
ES
T 

N
O
R
TH
W
ES
T
Fall 2000 Prop. 65
42. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25249.7.
43. Proposition 65 Notice Report, list of 60-day notices
(on file with the California Attorney General and the United
States House of Representatives Committee on Small Business).
44. See, e.g., D-Con Co., Inc. v. Allenby, 728 F. Supp. 605
(N.D. Cal. 1989) (Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide
Act); Committee of Dental Amalgam Mfrs. & Distrib. v. Stratton,
92 F.3d 807 (9th Cir. 1996) (Medical Device Amendments to the
Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act); Industrial Truck Ass’n v. Henry,
125 F.3d 1305 (9th Cir. 1996).
45. 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d 368.
46. 958 F.2d 941 (9th Cir. 1992).
47. Id. at 942.
48. Id. at 945.
49. Id. at 949.
50. Id. at 944.
51. Id. at 945.
52. Id. at 949.
53. Id.
materials known to the State of
California to cause cancer.”54
Finally, the court held Prop. 65 did not frus-
trate any congressional purpose:
On the one hand, a national safety
standard would ease the burden of
compliance for chemical product man-
ufacturers by relieving them from the
burden of complying with fifty-one sep-
arate regulatory schemes promulgated
by each state and the federal govern-
ment. On the other hand, such a stan-
dard would take police powers away
from the state who best knows how to
service the interests of their citizenry.
The preemption clause in FHSA bal-
ances these competing concerns by
leaving cautionary labeling require-
ments to the federal government while
allowing states to regulate the sale and
use of hazardous chemicals.
Proposition 65 warnings do not consti-
tute cautionary labeling preempted by
FHSA.55
California refined these arguments in
Cotter.56 In Cotter, defendant Cotter & Company
(“Cotter”) challenged a lower court decision
that the FHSA did not preempt Prop. 65. Cotter
argued Cipollone,57 a case in which the United
States Supreme Court held statutorily required
cigarette warnings preempted failure to warn
claims, rendered Chemical Specialties’ analy-
sis no longer good law. The Cotter court, how-
ever, disagreed.
First, the court found that Medtronic,58
decided after Cipollone, held that federal label-
ing statutes with general applicability do not
preempt state labeling requirements that “are
unlikely to interfere with the federal govern-
ment’s objective.”59 The court reasoned that the
“predicate duty” analysis used in Cipollone used
to preempt the failure to warn claims “does not
apply when both the federal and state statutes
require a general warning for a variety of prod-
ucts and do not target specific products.” 60
Therefore, the court concluded, Medtronic sup-
ported Allenby’s holdings that Prop. 65 and the
FHSA’s warnings are “nonidentical” and Prop.
65 does not frustrate any congressional pur-
pose.61
Second, the Cotter court sustained Allenby’s
conclusion that “point-of-sale” signs do not
constitute “cautionary labeling” under the
FHSA:
The act defines label as a “display of
written, printed, or graphic matter
upon the immediate container of any
substance . . . and (2) on all accompa-
nying literature where there are direc-
tions for use or otherwise.” . . . . 
Congress chose to restrict the defi-
nition of a label to include accompany-
ing literature only when that material
contains “directions for use.” . . . These
words indicate the warning must tell
the user how to use the product. This
situation resembles the one in
Medtronic, where the court refused to
interpret “requirement” in the preemp-
tion provision of the MDA to mean
“remedy” because “. . . if Congress
intended to preclude all common-law
causes of action, it chose a singularly
odd word with which to do it.” . . .
Similarly, if Congress wanted preemp-
tion under the FHSA to apply to all
accompanying literature with “implied”
directions for use, as Cotter argues,
Congress could have specified that.62
Therefore, California courts hold the FHSA
does not preempt Prop. 65 because (1) Prop.
65, a general warning statute, does not inter-
fere with a specific federal interest found in a
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54. Id.
55. Id. at 950.
56. 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d 368 (1997).
57. 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
58. 518 U.S. 470 (1996).
59. 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 379.
60. Id. at 1386.
61. See id.
62. Id. at 1387.
general warning statute; and (2) “cautionary
labeling” includes “directions for use,” and
Prop. 65 requires no directions for use.
Analyzing the Supreme Court cases identified
by Allenby and Cotter, subsequent case law, the
FHSA’s legislative history, and Congress’s
usage of “labeling” in similar statutes clearly
demonstrates the Allenby and Cotter courts
erred. First, the analysis demonstrates Prop. 65
requires a specific warning for a discernible
product class and interferes with a particular
federal interest. Second, the analysis finds no
current “cautionary labeling” definition, but
previous definitions did not include a “direc-
tions for use” element. Therefore, the
California courts erred in refusing to recognize
the FHSA preempts Prop. 65.
A. The FHSA Preempts State Court
Actions.
1. Preemption.
The Supremacy Clause of the United States
Constitution provides:
This Constitution and the Laws of the
United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties
made, or which shall be made, under
the Authority of the United States,
shall be the supreme Law of the Land;
and the Judges in every State shall be
bound thereby, any Thing in the
Constitution or Laws of any State to
the Contrary notwithstanding.63
Federal law preempts state law in three cir-
cumstances:
(1) express preemption, where Congress
explicitly defines the extent to which
its enactments preempt state law; (2)
field preemption, where state law
attempts to regulate conduct in a field
that Congress intended the federal law
exclusively to occupy; and (3) conflict
preemption, where it is impossible to
comply with both state and federal
requirements, or where state law
stands as an obstacle to the accom-
plishment and execution of the full
purpose and objectives of Congress.64
These categories are not “inflexible” as “[a]
state law that falls within a pre-empted field
conflicts with Congress’s [sic] intent (either
expressly or plainly implied) to exclude state
regulations.”65 When Congress preempts a
field, “state law that conflicts with federal law
is ‘without effect.’”66
States “traditionally have had great lati-
tude under their police powers to legislate as
to the protection of the lives, limbs, health,
comfort, and quiet of all persons.”67 Generally,
“the historic police powers of the State are not
to be superseded by Federal law unless that is
the ‘clear and manifest purpose of Congress.’”68
Courts discern Congress’s purpose from “the
language of the pre-emption statute and the
‘statutory framework’ surrounding it.”69
However, courts also find the “‘structure and
purpose of the statute as a whole,’ as revealed
not only in the text, but through the reviewing
court’s reasoned understanding of the way in
which Congress intended the statute and its
surrounding regulatory scheme to affect busi-
ness, consumers, and the law.”70
When Congress has considered the
issue of pre-emption and has included
in the enacted legislation a provision
explicitly addressing that issue, and
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63. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
64. Industrial Truck Ass’n v. Henry, 125 F.3d 1305, 1309 (9th
Cir. 1997) (citing English v. General Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78-80
(1990); Southern Pac. Transp. Co. v. Public Util. Comm’n, 9 F.3d
807 (9th Cir. 1993)).
65. Id. (citing English, 496 U.S. at 79 n.5). 
66. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516
(1992) (citing Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981)).
67. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 475 (1996) (quot-
ing Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 756
(1985)).
68. Busch v. Graphic Color Corp., 644 N.E.2d 839, 842 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1995) (citing Farner v. Brunswick Corp., 607 N.E.2d 562,
565 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992)). See also Industrial Truck Ass’n, 125 F.3d at
1309  (citing Law v. General Motors Corp., 114 F.3d 908, 909-10
(9th Cir. 1997)).
69. Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 486.
70. Id.
when that provision provides a ‘reli-
able indicium of congressional intent
with respect to state authority,’ ‘there
is no need to infer congressional intent
to pre-empt state laws from the sub-
stantive provisions’ of the legislation.
Such reasoning is a variant of the
familiar principle of expressio unius
est exclusio alterius: Congress’s enact-
ment of a provision defining the pre-
emptive reach of a statute implies that
matters beyond that reach are not pre-
empted.71
“Since the FHSA does have a specific pre-
emption clause, we need to determine ‘the
domain expressly pre-empted.’”72
2. The FHSA preempts “failure to
warn” claims.
Prop. 65 bars businesses from exposing an
individual “to a chemical known to the state to
cause cancer or reproductive toxicity without first
giving clear and reasonable warning to such individ-
ual.”73 At its core, Prop. 65 codifies a particular
“duty to warn.” Prior to the 1976 amendments,
courts recognized the FHSA preempted a
statutorily imposed “duty to warn,” e.g., a
“right-to-know” statute. 74 Subsequently, courts
recognized the FHSA preempts a common law
“duty to warn” claim. 
Like a common law-imposed “duty to
warn,” Prop. 65 imposes upon businesses a
duty to warn when California’s government
determines that a consumer product contains
a chemical believed to cause cancer or birth
defects.75 Unlike a typical common law claim, a
typical Prop. 65 claim rests upon a business’s
failure to satisfy a specific “duty to warn.” A
court’s inquiry into whether the FHSA pre-
empts a “failure to warn” claim is straightfor-
ward: courts ask whether the legal duty that is
the claim’s predicate meets “cautionary label-
ing requirements for hazardous substances
which are different from and are designed to
protect against the same risk of illness or injury
as those imposed by the FHSA.”76 Courts rou-
tinely hold the FHSA preempts common law
“failure to warn” claims that impose cautionary
labeling requirements; Prop. 65 is no excep-
tion. 
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr77 and Cipollone v. Liggett
Group, Inc.78 are the seminal cases “that address
the issue of federal preemption inadequate
labeling and failure-to-warn claims brought
under state law.”79 Together, these cases hold
that a federal labeling statute preempts a “fail-
ure to warn” claim predicated upon “additional
[or] more clearly-stated warnings” within the
preemptive scope, while claims predicated
upon a “general duty to inform users and pur-
chasers of potentially dangerous items of the
risks involved” are not preempted.80 The
California courts, however, ignore the
Cipollone and Medtronic directions. 
The California courts hold both the FHSA
and Prop. 65 are general warning statutes that
apply to a non-identifiable product class. The
court in Cotter, cites Medtronic for the proposi-
tion that “courts should broadly interpret the
preemption provision of federal statutes with
limited applicability and narrowly interpret
those statutes with general applicability.”81
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71. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 517 (citations omitted). 
72. People ex rel. Lungren v. Cotter & Co., 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d
368, 378 (citing Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 517). Notwithstanding the
court’s holding, the FHSA appears to expressly preempt state
cautionary labeling. See Pub. L. No. 94-284, § 17(a), 90 Stat. 510
(1976).
73. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25249.6 (West 2000)
(emphasis added).
74. Chemical Specialties Mfrs. Ass’n v. Clark, 482 F.2d 325,
328 (5th Cir. 1973); Chemical Specialties Mfrs. Ass’n v. Lowery,
452 F.2d 431, 440 (2d Cir. 1971).
75. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25249.6.
76. Busch v. Graphic Color Corp., 662 N.E.2d 397, 341 (Ill.
1996). See also Gurrieri v. William Zinsser & Co., 728 A.2d 832 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999); Canty v. Ever-Last Supply Co., 685 A.2d
1365 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1996). Cf. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 523-
24 (1992) (“The central inquiry in each case is straightforward: we
ask whether the legal duty that is the predicate of the common-
law damages action constitutes a ‘requirement or prohibition
based on smoking and health . . . imposed under State law with
respect to . . . advertising or promotion,’ giving that clause a fair
but narrow reading.”).
77. 518 U.S. 470 (1996).
78. 505 U.S. 504.
79. Gurrieri, 728 A.2d at 836.
80. Cipollone, 505 U.S. 504; Medtronic v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470
(1996); Gurrieri, 728 A.2d 832.  
81. People ex rel. Lungren v. Cotter & Co., 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d
368, 375 (1997).
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Applying this rationale, Cotter assumes
predicate duty analysis does not apply
when the federal statute merely
requires a general duty to inform users
and purchasers of potentially danger-
ous items. When the predicate for the
plaintiff’s claims is the general duty to
inform users and purchasers of poten-
tially dangerous items and the federal
government has not implemented or
enforced specific federal requirements,
general obligations imposed by the
state do not threaten the federal
requirements.82
Therefore, Cotter concludes Cipollone and
Medtronic preclude Prop. 65’s preemption.
Neither case, however, supports Cotter’s analysis. 
In Cipollone, plaintiff, Thomas Cipollone 83
(“Cipollone”), claimed defendants caused Rose
Cipollone’s death because, among other
things, “they failed to warn consumers about
the hazards of smoking [and] . . . they fraudu-
lently misrepresented those hazards to con-
sumers.”84 Defendants argued the Federal
Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965
and its successor, the Public Health Cigarette
Smoking Act of 1969, preempted Cipollone’s
claim and the Court agreed.
The Court analyzed several statutes. In
1965, Congress passed the Federal Labeling
and Advertising Act (“1965 Act”):
Section 2 of the Act declares the
statute’s two purposes: (1) adequately
informing the public that cigarette
smoking may be hazardous to health,
and (2) protecting the national econo-
my from the burden imposed by
diverse, nonuniform, and confusing
cigarette labeling and advertising regu-
lations.85
The 1965 Act defined “cigarette” as:
(A) any roll of tobacco wrapped in
paper or in any substance not contain-
ing tobacco, and
(B) any roll of tobacco wrapped in any
substance containing tobacco which,
because of its appearance, the type of
tobacco used in the filler, or its packag-
ing and labeling, is likely to be offered
to, or purchase by, consumers as a cig-
arette described in subparagraph (A).86
In order to maintain nationally uniform
cigarette labeling standards, Congress enacted
a “preemption” provision. Section 5, in perti-
nent part, provided the following:
(a) No statement relating to smoking
and health, other than the statement
required by section 4 of this Act, shall
be required on any cigarette package.
(b) No statement relating to smoking
and health shall be required in the
advertising of any cigarettes the pack-
ages of which are labeled in conformi-
ty with the provisions of this Act.87
In 1969, Congress enacted the Public
Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969 (“1969
Act”), which amended the 1965 Act, section
5(b). The 1969 Act, section 5(b), provided the
following:
(b) No requirement or prohibition
based on smoking and health shall be
imposed under State law with respect
to the advertising or promotion of any
cigarettes the packages of which are
labeled in conformity with the provi-
sions of this Act.88
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82. Id. at 385 (citations omitted).
83. Rose Cipollone and her husband filed suit.
Subsequently, both died and Thomas Cipollone, their son and
executor, maintained the action. See Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 509.
84. Id. at 508.
85. Id. at 514.
86. 15 U.S.C. § 1332(1) (2000).
87. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 514.
88. Id. at 515.
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The 1965 Act prohibited state and federal
rulemaking bodies “from mandating particular
cautionary statements on cigarette labels or in
cigarette advertisements.”89 Cipollone’s claims
involved common law duties, not state man-
dated action. Therefore, the 1965 Act did not
preempt Cipollone’s claim. 
The 1969 Act, however, broadened the pre-
emption clause. The 1969 Act barred all
“requirements or prohibitions” regarding the
“advertising or promotion” of cigarettes90 The
“requirements or prohibitions” language
included common-law damages actions:
The phrase “no requirement or prohibi-
tion” sweeps broadly and suggests no
distinction between positive enact-
ments and common law; to the con-
trary, those words easily encompass
obligations that take the form of com-
mon-law rules. As we noted in another
context, “[state] regulation can be as
effectively exerted through an award of
damages as through some form of pre-
ventive relief. The obligation to pay
compensation can be, indeed, is
designed to be, a potent method of
governing conduct and controlling pol-
icy.”91
Furthermore, the existence of a legal duty,
necessary for Cipollone’s common law dam-
ages claim, imposes a “requirement or prohibi-
tion”:
It is in this way that the 1969 version of
Sec. 5(b) differs from its predecessor:
Whereas the common law would not
normally require a vendor to use any
specific statement on its packages or in
its advertisements, it is the essence of
the common law to enforce duties that
are either affirmative requirements or
negative prohibitions. We therefore
reject petitioner’s argument that the
phrase “requirement or prohibition”
limits the 1969 Act’s pre-emptive scope
to positive enactments by legislature
and agencies.92
To determine whether Section 5(b) pre-
empted Cipollone’s “failure to warn” and fraud
claims, “[t]he central inquiry in each case is
straightforward: we ask whether the legal duty
that is the predicate of the common-law dam-
ages action constitutes a ‘requirement or pro-
hibition based on smoking and health . . .
imposed under State law with respect to . . .
advertising or promotion,’ giving that clause a
fair but narrow reading.”93
A “failure to warn” claim requires, among
other things, evidence that “a warning is nec-
essary to make a product . . . reasonably safe,
suitable and fit for its intended use.”94
Cipollone claimed defendants failed “to pro-
vide ‘adequate warnings of the health conse-
quences of cigarette smoking.’”95 In other
words, Cipollone claimed the law required
defendants to include additional label lan-
guage that highlighted smoking’s dangers. The
1969 Act, the Court found, preempted
Cipollone’s “failure to warn” claim to the extent
the claim required “a showing that respon-
dents’ post-1969 advertising or promotions
should have included additional, or more
clearly stated, warnings.”96
Likewise, the 1969 Act preempted
Cipollone’s fraud claims. Cipollone claimed
defendants, through advertising, minimized
smoking’s health effects and failed to disclose
its dangers. Cipollone’s “minimization” claim
“is merely the converse of a state-law require-
ment that warnings be included in advertising
and promotion materials.”97 The 1969 Act par-
tially preempted Cipollone’s “fraudulent con-
cealment” claim.
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89. Id. at 518. 
90. Id. at 520.
91. Id. at 521 (citing San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v.
Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 247 (1959)).
92. Id. at 522 (emphasis omitted).
93. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 523-24.
94. Id. at 524.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 527 (emphasis omitted).
The predicate of this claim is a state-
law duty not to make false statements
of material fact or to conceal such
facts. Our pre-emption analysis
requires us to determine whether such
a duty is the sort of requirement or
prohibition proscribed by sec. 5(b).
Section 5(b) pre-empts only the impo-
sition of state-law obligations “with
respect to the advertising or promo-
tion” of cigarettes. [Cipollone’s] claims
that [defendants] concealed material
facts are therefore not pre-empted
insofar as those claims rely on a state-
law to disclose such facts through
channels of communication other than
advertising or promotion. Thus, for
example, if state law obliged [defen-
dants] to disclose material facts about
smoking and health to an administra-
tive agency, sec. 5(b) would not pre-
empt a state-law claim based on a fail-
ure to fulfill that obligation.98
In short, the 1969 Act preempted
Cipollone’s claims to the extent they sought to
add, detract or clarify a “requirement or prohi-
bition” concerning cigarette “advertising or
promotion,” but did not preempt other claims. 
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr applies Cipollone’s rea-
soning to instances when a federal statute
does not preempt a state cause of action. In
Medtronic, Medtronic, Inc. (“Medtronic”), manu-
factured a pacemaker lead.99 Lora Lohr depend-
ed on a pacemaker for proper heart function. In
1990, Lora Lohr’s Medtronic pacemaker failed.
The Lohrs100 sued, claiming Medtronic “failed
to warn” of the pacemaker’s tendency to fail.
Medtronic claimed the Medical Device
Amendments of 1976 to the Food, Drug and
Cosmetic Act (“MDA”) preempted her claims.
The Court, however, disagreed.
Congress passed the MDA “to provide for
the safety and effectiveness of medical devices
intended for human use.”101 Generally, the MDA
establishes a system by which the FDA
approves medical devices for consumer use.
The FDA approves some products, such as
Medtronic’s lead, absent review because a
“substantially equivalent” medical device is
already marketed. The MDA requires labeling
regulations
that require manufacturers of every
medical device with a few limited
exceptions, to include with the device a
label containing “information for use, .
. . and any relevant hazards, contraindi-
cations, side effects and precau-
tions.”102
Congress also enacted a MDA preemption
provision. 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) states:
(a) General rule
Except as provided in subsection (b) of
this section, no State or political sub-
division of a State may establish or
continue in effect with respect to a
device intended for human use any
requirement—
(1) which is different from, or in addi-
tion to, any requirement applicable
under this chapter to the device, and
(2) which relates to the safety or effec-
tiveness of the device or to any other
matter included in a requirement
applicable to the device under this
chapter.103
Contrary to Cipollone, Medtronic held the
MDA did not preempt Lohrs’ “failure to warn”
claim.
The pre-emptive statute in Cipollone
was targeted at a limited set of state
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98. Id. at 528.
99. “The lead is the portion of a pacemaker that transmits
the heartbeat-steadying electrical signal from the ‘pulse genera-
tor’ to the heart itself.” 518 U.S. 470, 480 (1996).
100. Lora Lohr’s husband also joined the suit.
101. Id. at 474.
102. Id. at 497 (citing 21 C.F.R. §§ 801.109(b), (c) (1995)).
103. Id. at 481.
requirements—those “based on smok-
ing and health”—and then only at a
limited subset of the possible applica-
tions of those requirements—those
involving the “advertising or promotion
of any cigarettes the packages of which
are labeled in conformity with the pro-
visions of” the federal statute.104
By contrast,
[t]he legal duty that is the predicate for
the Lohrs’ failure to warn claim is the
general duty to inform users and pur-
chasers of potentially dangerous items
of the risks involved in their use. These
general obligations are no more a
threat to federal requirements than
would be a state-law duty to comply
with local fire prevention regulations
and zoning codes, or to use due care in
the training and supervision of a work
force. These state requirements, there-
fore, escape pre-emption not because
of the source of the duty is a judge-
made common-law rule, but rather
because their generality leaves them
outside the category of requirements
that sec. 360k envisioned to be “with
respect to” specific devices such as
pacemakers.105
Preemption, the Court continued, occurs
“only where a particular state requirement
threatens to interfere with a specific federal
interest.”106 The MDA regulations require med-
ical device manufacturers to include on a prod-
uct’s label information for use, any relevant
hazards, contraindications, side effects and
precautions as well as to comply with the Good
Manufacturing Practices.107 Furthermore, the
MDA regulations exclude from preemption
State or local requirements of general
applicability where the purpose of the
requirement relates either to other
products in addition to devices . . . or
to unfair trade practices in which the
requirements are not limited to
devices. The regulations specifically
provide, as examples of permissible
general requirements, that general
electrical codes and the Uniform
Commercial Code warranty of fitness
would not be pre-empted. The regula-
tions even go so far as to state that sec.
360k(a) generally “does not preempt a
state or local requirement prohibiting
the manufacture of adulterated or mis-
branded devices” unless “such a prohi-
bition has the effect of establishing a
substantive requirement for a specific
device.”108
The MDA’s general nature, the Court
concluded, and the requirement’s generality,
make this quite unlike a case in which
the Federal Government has weighed
the competing interests relevant to the
particular requirement in question,
reached an unambiguous conclusion
about how those competing considera-
tions should be resolved in a particular
case or set of cases, and implement
that conclusion via a specific mandate
on manufacturers or producers. Rather,
the federal requirements reflect impor-
tant but entirely generic concerns
about device regulation generally, not
the sort of concerns regarding a specif-
ic device or field device regulation that
the statute or regulations were
designed to protect from contradictory
state requirements.109
Therefore, the Court found the MDA did not
preempt Lohrs’ claims.
Assuming the California courts correctly
analyzed Cipollone and Medtronic, the FHSA never
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104. 518 U.S. at 488 (citing Cipollone v. Liggett, 505 U.S.
504, 515 (1992)).
105. Id. at 501 (emphasis added).
106. Id. at 500.
107. Id. at 497.
108. Id. at 499.
109. Id. at 501.
preempts a state “failure to warn” claim. The
Cotter court’s analysis renders the Cipollone
“predicate duty” analysis inapplicable because
both the FHSA and a state duty to warn
“require a general warning for a variety of prod-
ucts and do not target specific products.”110
This means “failure to warn” claims would
“escape pre-emption not because the source of
the duty is a judge-made common-law rule,
but rather because their generality leaves them
outside the category of requirements [the fed-
eral statute] envisioned to be [preempted].”111
In other words, the duty is too general to iden-
tify a specific product category to which it
would apply. No “predicate duty” analysis
appears fatal to federal preemption clauses.
However, in Etcheverry v. Tri-Ag Service, Inc., the
California Supreme Court rejected such an
analysis with respect to FIFRA.112 Furthermore,
courts subsequent to Medtronic routinely hold
the FHSA preempts “failure to warn” cases to
the extent plaintiffs propose “additional, differ-
ent, or more clearly-stated warnings.”113 Gurrieri
v. William Zinsser and Co.114 is the most recent
case analyzing the FHSA’s preemptive clause.115
In Gurrieri, plaintiff Dolores Gurrieri
(“Gurrieri”) suffered inhalation injuries from
exposure to a stain blocker manufactured by
defendant William Zinsser & Co., Inc. (“William
Zinsser”).116 Gurrieri sued William Zinsser
claiming its product label failed to warn con-
sumers that a particular chemical in the prod-
uct presented fatal risks.117 William Zinsser
moved for summary judgment on the grounds
that the FHSA preempted Gurrieri's claim.118
The court agreed and granted the motion.119
The court examined the FHSA’s preemptive
clause, Cipollone, and Medtronic, recognizing
both cases applied the “predicate” analysis
Cotter avoided,120 and Canty v. Ever-Last Supply
Co.121 The court held that
[i]n the present case, the 1966 preemp-
tion amendment to the FHSA inter-
preted in light of the intent of Congress
to provide “nationally uniform require-
ments for adequate cautionary label-
ing,” as expressed with the passage of
the FHSA in 1960, demonstrates
Congress’s specific design to preempt
state failure-to-warn labeling claims.
H.R. Rep. No. 86-1861, at 1 (1960),
reprinted in 1960 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2833.
This conclusion is also supported by
the Supreme Court’s reasoning in
Cipollone which is doctrinally similar to
the present case. Both situations
demonstrate strong Congressional lan-
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110. People ex rel. Lungren v. Cotter & Co., 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d
368, 377 (1997).
111. Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 502.
112. 993 P.2d 366 (Cal. 2000).
113. Gurrieri v. William Zinsser & Co., 728 A.2d 832,
841(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999). See also Torres-Rios v. LPS
Labs., Inc., 152 F.3d 11 (1st Cir. 1998); Sabbatino v. Rosin & Sons
Hardware & Paint, Inc., 676 N.Y.S.2d 633 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998); Litz
v. William Zinsser & Co., 676 N.Y.S.2d 619 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998);
Beyrle v. Finneron, 645 N.Y.S.2d 192 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996); Canty v.
Ever-Last Supply Co., 685 A.2d 1365 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
1996).
114. 728 A.2d 832.
115. Interestingly, Cotter appears to ignore its own holding.
Cotter held “courts should broadly interpret the preemption pro-
vision of federal statutes with limited applicability and narrowly
interpret those statutes with general applicability.”   62 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 375. Accordingly, Cotter claimed the FHSA, as a general
statute, did not preempt Prop. 65. Similarly, Cotter would appear
to recognize that a federal warning for specific chemicals, i.e., one
of limited applicability, preempts Prop. 65. See, e.g., Papike v.
Tambrands, Inc., 107 F.3d 737, 741-43 (9th Cir. 1997) (“In this case,
the FDA has promulgated a regulation mandating the specific
substantive content of the T[oxic] S[hock] S[yndrome] warnings
on tampon boxes and/or tampon package inserts. [Citation omit-
ted.] The regulation is not only device-specific (tampons), but
also disease-specific (TSS). This fact distinguishes Papike’s case
from prior relevant MDA preemption cases.”). Cotter involved the
chemical “toluene.” The FHSA provides toluene specific warnings.
16 C.F.R. § 1500.14 (2000). Nevertheless, Cotter failed to hold that
the FHSA toluene specific warnings preempt Prop. 65. Therefore,
the Cotter analysis appears to bar any federal labeling statute,
whether limited or broad, from preempting Prop. 65.
116. 728 A.2d at 833-34.
117. See id. at 833.
118. See id. at 834.
119. See id.
120. See id. at 839.
121. Canty v. Ever-Last Supply Co., 685 A.2d 1365, 1373
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1996) (holding that “[w]here a plaintiff’s
claim seeks to hold a manufacturer responsible for failing to pro-
vide warning labels which are not identical to [but stronger than]
those required under the FHSA, the claim is preempted [and
fails]”). However, “[where] a plaintiff does not seek more elabo-
rate labeling requirements, but rather asserts an alleged failure
to comply with the FHSA, such a claim would not impose a ‘label-
ing requirement’ and would not be preempted.” Id. at 1373. As a
result, “[the court], based on [its] perception of the ‘weight of
authority,’ concluded that a failure-to-warn claim could be
brought only for failure to comply with the FHSA’s labeling provi-
sions.” Gurrieri, 728 A.2d at 840 (citations omitted).
guage supporting a policy of federal
labeling preemption. Similar to the cir-
cumstances . . . in the present case,
[plaintiff] proposes additional label
warnings not “identical” to the labeling
requirements under the federal act. . . .
[T]o the extent that the plaintiff pro-
poses additional, different, or more
clearly-stated warnings, these claims
are preempted by the FHSA.122
Requiring companies to adopt Gurrieri’s
proposed cautionary labeling, the court rea-
soned, would frustrate Congress’s purpose:
A finding that specific local warnings
pursuant to state law must apply to
products containing less than 4% of
methyl alcohol would create a system
of possibly fifty or more different label-
ing requirements throughout the coun-
try, contrary to Congress’s obvious
intent in passing the FHSA to “provide
nationally uniform requirements for
adequate cautionary labeling.”123
Therefore, the court found the FHSA preempt-
ed Gurrieri’s “failure to warn” claim.124
Unlike the general duties not to manufac-
ture adulterated or misbranded devices or to
obey general electric codes as identified in
Medtronic, the FHSA and Prop. 65 require partic-
ular cautionary labeling warnings for specific
products. Cipollone’s Cigarette Labeling Act pre-
empts state law claims so long as cigarette
advertising contains requisite warning lan-
guage. All advertising, however, does not fall
within the Cigarette Labeling Act’s province.
Only an advertisement (i.e., all package labels,
billboard advertisement, magazine and news-
paper advertisements or sporting event ads)
that advertises cigarettes, a term the statute
defines, and contain the requisite cautionary
labeling fall within the discernible class.125
Similarly, the FHSA preempted the Gurrieri
plaintiff’s claim because the FHSA required
cautionary labeling for a discernible product
(i.e., those containing methyl alcohol).126
The FHSA requires particular cautionary
labeling for a discernible class of consumer
products. These include toxicants, corrosives,
irritants, strong sensitizers, flammables, and
substances that generate pressure.127 The FHSA
excludes poisons subject to the Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act
and food, drugs, and cosmetics subject to the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, as well
as stored fuels used in heating, cooking, or
refrigeration. Furthermore, only those toxics,
corrosives, irritants, strong sensitizers or flam-
mables that “may cause substantial personal
injury or substantial illness during or as a prox-
imate result of any customary or reasonably
foreseeable ingestion by children” are subject
to FHSA’s cautionary labeling requirements.128
“Substantial personal injury or substantial ill-
ness,” the FHSA’s legislative history notes,
should be read in the light of the pur-
poses of the bill. On the one hand, it is
not intended to impose the impractica-
ble and self-defeating requirement of
cautionary labeling against the wholly
insignificant or negligible illness or
injury, such as the very temporary
indisposition that a child might suffer
from eating a piece of the standard
type of toilet soap. The committee rec-
ognized that virtually every substance
used in or about the household is
capable of causing some degree of ill-
ness or injury if accidentally or inten-
tionally misused. . . . On the other
hand, the term “substantial” is not
intended to limit the requirement of
cautionary labeling to situations in
which the injury or illness to be guard-
ed against would be severe or seri-
ous.129
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122. Gurrieri, 728 A.2d at 841.
123. Id.
124. See id.
125. See id.
126. See id.
127. 960 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2833.
128. Id. at 2837.
129. Id. 
Moreover, CPSC clearly recognizes that “sub-
stantial personal injury or substantial illness”
includes both cancer and reproductive toxicity.
In 1992, CPSC published “Guidelines for
Determining Chronic Toxicity of Products
Subject to the FHSA.” CPSC notes in the
Guidelines that
the definition of “hazardous substance”
requires both that the substance fall
into one of the designated hazard cate-
gories, in this case that of “toxic,” and
that the substance “may cause sub-
stantial personal injury or illness dur-
ing or as a proximate result of any cus-
tomary or reasonably foreseeable han-
dling or use, including reasonably fore-
seeable ingestion by children.” Any of
the chronic hazards, including but not
limited to cancer, neurotoxicity or
developmental or reproductive toxicity
addressed by this notice constitute
“personal injury or illness.”130
FHSA requires products bearing these
characteristics to include specific statutory
required warnings.131 Furthermore, courts rec-
ognize the FHSA affords the CPSC additional
authority to “establish by regulation reason-
able variation or additional labeling require-
ments.”132
Prop. 65 applies narrower warnings to a
narrower product class. Prop. 65 requires a
manufacturer to add to its federally mandated
cautionary labeling if a product contains a
chemical California believes causes cancer or
reproductive toxicity. Like the cigarette adver-
tising subject to the Cigarette Labeling Act’s
preemption, the products containing the
chemicals California determines might cause
cancer or reproductive toxicity constitute a dis-
cernible class that requires Prop. 65’s warn-
ings. As with the FHSA, a product falls in the
category required to contain a warning simply
by containing an identified chemical. Products
with such a chemical must warn that the prod-
uct contains “a chemical known to [California]
to cause cancer or reproductive toxicity.”133
The FHSA preempts Prop. 65’s cautionary
labeling for consumer products, not food
served in food facilities, fresh fruits, nuts and
vegetables, or alcoholic beverages. The prod-
ucts covered by the FHSA, i.e., those consumer
products containing toxicants, corrosives, irri-
tants, strong sensitizers, flammables or that
generate pressure and pose a risk of substan-
tial injury or illness, include chemicals
California finds may cause cancer or reproduc-
tive toxicity.134 Furthermore, the FHSA’s cau-
tionary labeling requirements include warn-
ings for cancer and reproductive toxicity.
Therefore, as the FHSA applies to a discernible
class which includes Prop. 65’s chemicals and
the FHSA requires cautionary labeling that
includes reproductive toxicity and cancer, the
FHSA preempts Prop. 65.
Claims that require specific warnings for a
discernible product class, whether arising from
the Gurrieri plaintiff’s common law warning or
from Prop. 65’s statutory warning, resemble
those in Cipollone, not those in Medtronic.
Indeed, the Cipollone court preempted “failure
to warn” claims only for those “advertisements”
that advertised cigarettes and contained statu-
torily required warnings. Likewise, the Gurrieri
court held the FHSA preempted claims for a
hazardous substance, i.e., methyl alcohol, con-
taining the requisite cautionary labeling. By
contrast, the Medtronic defendant failed to iden-
tify either a particular medical device sub-cate-
gory or particular warnings that might preempt
state “general duty” claims. At most, the
Medtronic defendant identified a general class,
i.e., all medical devices, to which a general
warning, i.e., to inform users and purchasers of
all potential dangers, applied. This differs from
the FHSA, which requires specific cautionary
labeling (i.e., those found in 15 U.S.C. § 1261
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130. 57 Fed. Reg. 46,626 (1992). See also Busch v. Graphic
Color Corp., 662 N.E.2d 397, 341 (Ill. 1996), (cancer); 56 Fed. Reg.
15,672 (1991) (reproductive toxicity).
131. See 15 U.S.C. § 1261.
132. Gurrieri v. William Zinsser & Co., 728 A.2d 832, 836
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999).
133. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25249.5.
134. See, e.g., Corrosion Proof Fittings v. Environmental
Prot. Agency, 947 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1991) (asbestos); A&B Wiper
Supply, Inc. v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n, 514 F. Supp. 1145
(E.D. Pa. 1981) (TRIS phosphate).
and the corresponding regulations) for a dis-
cernible product class (i.e., those consumer
products containing toxicants, corrosives, irri-
tants, strong sensitizers, flammables or that
generate pressure and pose a threat of sub-
stantial personal injury or illness); and from
Prop. 65, which requires specific cautionary
labeling (i.e., that a consumer product con-
tains chemicals known to California to cause
cancer or reproductive toxicity) to a specific
product class (i.e., those consumer products
containing chemicals California determined
may cause cancer or reproductive toxicity).
In short, if a court identifies federal warn-
ings or cautionary labeling and a discernible
class to which the cautionary labeling or warn-
ings apply, if intended, the federal require-
ments preempt state warnings for a similarly
discernible state class. Prop. 65 establishes a
substantive requirement, i.e., cautionary label-
ing not identical to the FHSA’s cautionary
labeling requirements, for a particular device,
i.e., products containing specific chemicals.
The predicate for a bounty hunter’s Prop. 65
claim rests not upon a general duty to warn
about cancer, but upon a defendant’s failure to
warn that a product contains a specific chemi-
cal known to California to cause reproductive
toxicity. In Cipollone and Gurrieri, the courts
found particular discernible product classes to
which Congress mandated warnings, while the
Medtronic court located neither a discernible
class nor particular warnings. A comparison
between Prop. 65’s duty to warn about cancer
and a general duty to warn about cancer illus-
trates this point. 
Some jurisdictions recognize a manufac-
turer’s general duty to warn includes cancer
warnings.135 This general duty requires a manu-
facturer to warn its product causes cancer
at least insofar as it subjects manufac-
turers to strict liability for injuries
caused by their products sold in an
unreasonably dangerous condition.
Comment k to Sec. 402A provides that
some products inherently unsafe can
be prevented from being unreasonably
dangerous by furnishing the user with
an adequate warning of the hazards of
the product. . . . Because one of the
purposes of the warning is to allow the
user to make his own decision whether
to expose himself to the risks of harm,
. . . a manufacturer fulfills its duty to
warn in this context only if it warns of
all dangers associated with its prod-
ucts of which it has actual or construc-
tive knowledge.136
The FHSA does not preempt claims that a
manufacturer failed to satisfy this general duty
because there is no specific warning or a dis-
cernible class to apply the warning. Like the
Medtronic case, this duty requires a manufactur-
er to warn of all dangers including, but not lim-
ited to, cancer or reproductive toxicity, associ-
ated with all products including, but not limit-
ed to, consumer products within the FHSA. The
general duty imposes no specific warning for a
discernible product class. Therefore, the FHSA
does not preempt a statutory or common law
duty that requires manufacturers to provide all
warnings necessary to render a product safe.
The FHSA preempts those claims that require a
manufacturer to add, detract or alter its FHSA
cautionary labeling requirements. The FHSA
does not preempt state law requirements that
impose a duty upon a manufacturer to warn
consumers in a manner other than “cautionary
labeling,” i.e., television, radio, or reporting to
a state agency, that a particular product con-
tains a chemical known to California to cause
cancer or reproductive toxicity. Prop. 65, how-
ever, requires a FHSA-compliant manufacturer
to include in its cautionary labeling a warning
that a consumer product contains a chemical
that causes cancer or reproductive toxicity. As
Medtronic recognized, requiring a manufacturer
to include such a warning in its cautionary
labeling “threatens to interfere with a specific
federal interest,” e.g., uniform cautionary labeling.
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135. See, e.g., Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 750
F.2d 1314, 1320 (5th Cir. 1985).
136. Id.
A recent California Supreme Court deci-
sion, Carrillo v. ACF Industries,137 also recognizes
that a federal statute preempts a state claim
that seeks to alter or amend duties imposed by
federal statute, but not a general duty to obey
the law. In Carrillo, plaintiff Jose Carrillo
(“Carrillo”) sued defendant ACF Industries, Inc.
(“ACF”) for failing to equip a railroad car with
safety devices necessary to secure a worker
atop the car against falls.138 The California
Supreme Court recognized that the Safety
Appliance Act (“SAA”), 42 U.S.C. § 20301 et
seq., preempts state common law defective
design claims premised upon the failure of a
safety device:
“[T]he United States has exercised its
exclusive powers over interstate com-
merce so far as to take possession of
the field [of rail safety appliance], [and
thus] the States can no more supple-
ment its requirements than they can
annul them.” [Citation omitted.] . . .
“So far as the safety equipment of [rail]
vehicles is concerned, these Acts oper-
ate to exclude state regulation whether
consistent, complementary, additional,
or otherwise.” [Citation omitted.] As
Justice Holmes succinctly explained,
“The subject matter in this instance is
particularly one that calls for uniform
law. . . .” [Citation omitted.].139
However, the California Supreme Court also
recognized the SAA does not preempt a gener-
al duty to design safe cars and locomotives.140
Nevertheless, the court found, Carrillo’s claim
intended to increase ACF’s obligations beyond
those the SAA required.141 Assuming the
California Supreme Court permitted Carrillo to
increase ACF’s obligations, “Congress’s goal of
a uniform federal railroad regulation would be
undermined.”142 The SAA’s preemption clause,
however, barred such a result.
Likewise, the FHSA bars a common law or
statutory cautionary labeling claim that adds,
detracts or clarifies cautionary labeling risks of
injury or illness subject to FHSA warnings.
Prop. 65 imposes upon businesses a duty to
warn consumers through cautionary labeling
that particular products contain certain chemi-
cals California believes cause cancer or repro-
ductive toxicity. A cautionary label warning
that “California believes a chemical causes
cancer or reproductive toxicity” is an addition-
al warning imposed by state law. Each state
might require a similar cautionary label warn-
ing for different chemicals it determines cause
cancer. Gurrieri recognized this “would create a
system of possibly fifty or more different label-
ing requirements throughout the country, con-
trary to Congress’s obvious intent in passing
the FHSA to ‘provide nationally uniform
requirements for adequate cautionary label-
ing.’”143 Requiring manufacturers to include
additional or clarifying language in their cau-
tionary labeling falls squarely in the FHSA’s
preemption provision.
The California courts recognize the FHSA
preempts “cautionary labeling” content. They
define “cautionary labeling” to avoid the
FHSA’s preemptive effect. The courts’ defini-
tion, however, exceeds the “cautionary label-
ing” definition Congress provided. A CPSC
promulgated “cautionary labeling” definition
reflects the manner in which Congress defines
the term and remedies the California courts’
erroneous definition.
B. CPSC Should Define “Cautionary
Labeling” to Reflect Congress’s Intent to
Preempt “Cautionary Labeling”
Requirements.
In addition to holding the FHSA does not
preempt Prop. 65 because both statutes apply
general duties to non-discernible products, the
California courts find that “[a] retail outlet can
comply with Proposition 65 by posting a sign in
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137. 980 P.2d 386 (Cal. 1999).
138. Id. at 388.
139. Id. at 389.
140. See, e.g., Atlantic Line v. Georgia, 234 U.S. 280 (1914)
(permitting plaintiff to maintain claim for railroad’s failure to affix
a state mandated light). 
141. Carrillo, 980 P.2d at 390.
142. Id. at 393 (citing Law v. General Motors Corp., 114 F.3d
908, 910-11 (9th Cir. 1997)).
143. Gurrieri v. William Zinsser & Co., 728 A.2d 832, 841
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999).
a visible place specifying the products that are
known to the state to cause cancer or that are
reproductively toxic.” “Point-of-sale” warnings,
the court concluded, did not constitute “cau-
tionary labeling.”144
In Chemical Specialties Manufacturers Association
v. Allenby, the court acknowledged FHSA sec-
tion 17(b) preempts “all state mandated pre-
cautionary labeling that is not identical to that
required by the Act.”145 The court endeavored to
define “cautionary” or “precautionary” labeling.
However, rather than adopting CPSC’s “precau-
tionary labeling” definition, the court grafted
the definition of “label” and the “directions for
use” requirement into a “labeling” definition:
Under the FHSA, however, “all accom-
panying literature where there are
directions for use, written or other-
wise” is defined as cautionary labeling,
15 U.S.C. Sec. 1261(n)(2) (1988).
Accompanying literature is defined as
follows:
Any placard, pamphlet, booklet, book,
sign, or other written, printed, or
graphic matter or visual device that
provides directions for use, written or
otherwise, and that is used in connec-
tion with the display, sale, demonstra-
tion, or merchandising of a hazardous
substance intended for . . . use in the
household or by children.146
In circular fashion, the court concluded
“point-of-sale” warnings contain no directions
for use. Therefore, the FHSA does not preempt
Prop. 65.147
The court in Cotter Chemical Specialties’ tauto-
logical reasoning:
The act defines label as a “display of
written, printed, or graphic matter
upon the immediate container of any
substance . . . and (2) on all accompa-
nying literature where there are direc-
tions for use, written or otherwise.” (15
U.S.C. § 1261(n).) Congress chose to
restrict the definition of a label to
include accompanying literature only
when that material contains “direc-
tions for use.” (15 U.S.C. § 1261(n).)
These words indicate the warning must
tell the user how to use the product. . .
. [I]f Congress wanted preemption
under the FHSA to apply to all accom-
panying literature with “implied” direc-
tions for use, as Cotter argues,
Congress could have specified that.148
Therefore, the court concluded the FHSA
does not preempt Prop. 65.
Both courts graft the “directions for use”
requirement into “cautionary labeling” in order
to avoid preemption. However, Congress did
not restrict either “label” or “labeling” to
“accompanying literature” containing “direc-
tions for use.” Both the FHSA’s legislative his-
tory and Congress’s use of “labeling” in other
statutes demonstrate the FHSA includes
“point-of-sale” warnings and preempts Prop.
65. A CPSC-promulgated “cautionary labeling”
definition would restore Congress’s preemp-
tive intent and would correct the courts’ errant
rulings.
1. The FHSA’s legislative history does
not support the California courts’
conclusion that either “label” or
“labeling” include a “directions for
use” restriction.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals’ and the
California Court of Appeal’s “cautionary label-
ing” definitions rest on the definition of “label”
in FHSA section 2(n). Accompanying literature,
according to the courts, is not a “label” unless
it contains “directions for use.”149 Congress,
however, separately defined “label” and “label-
ing.” Neither definition requires “directions for
use.”
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144. Chemical Specialties Mfrs. Ass’n v. Allenby, 958 F.2d
941, 944 (9th Cir. 1992).
145. Id. at 949.
146. Id. (citing 16 C.F.R. § 1500.3(c)(9) (1991)).
147. Id.
148. People ex rel. Lungren v. Cotter & Co., 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d
368, 378 (1997).
149. See Chemical Specialties, 958 F.2d 941, 949 (9th Cir. 1992);
Cotter, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 378.
In the 1938 Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
(FDCA), 21 U.S.C. § 301 et seq., Congress both
defined “label” and provided certain require-
ments. First, Congress stated that, “[t]he term
“label” means a display of written, printed, or
graphic matter upon the immediate container
of any article.”150
Second, Congress encumbered “label” with
specific requirements:
a requirement made by or under
authority of this chapter that any word,
statement, or other information appear
on the label shall not be considered to
be complied with unless such word,
statement, or other information also
appears on the outside container or
wrapper, if any there be, of the retail
package of such article, or is easily leg-
ible through the outside container or
wrapper.151
Congress recognized “label” did not include
items accompanying the article and defined
“labeling” to mean, “all labels and other writ-
ten, printed, or graphic matter (1) upon any
article or any of its containers or wrappers, or
(2) accompanying such article.”152
Therefore, placards, pamphlets, booklets,
books, signs, or other written, printed, or
graphic matter or visual devices used in con-
nection with the display, sale, demonstration,
or merchandising of an article, but not upon
the immediate container, are “labeling,” not a
“label.”
Likewise, in the 1960 FHSA, Congress both
defined “label” and provided certain require-
ments. First, Congress defined “label” with ref-
erence to the FDCA, “‘Label’ is defined, as in
the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, as a
display of written, printed, or graphic matter
upon the immediate container of any sub-
stance.”153
Second, it is instructive that the FHSA’s
“label” requirements differ from the FDCA’s
requirements. Under the FHSA,
[a] requirement issued pursuant to this
legislation requiring certain informa-
tion to appear on the label will not be
considered to be complied with unless
such information also appears (1) on
the outside container or wrapper, if any
there be, unless it is easily legible
through the outside container or wrap-
per and (2) on all accompanying litera-
ture where there are directions for use,
written or otherwise.154
Grafting the FHSA’s “directions for use”
requirement into the “label” definition appears
inconsistent with Congress’s original intent
that FHSA and FDCA define “label” similarly.
The FDCA’s “label” definition lacks such a
requirement, and Congress, by separately
defining “labeling,” exhibited no intent to graft
the requirement into the definition. Instead,
the phrase “where there are directions for use,
written or otherwise” should be interpreted as
a location, i.e., the warnings should appear on
accompanying literature in the same location
as directions for use. This interpretation recon-
ciles both Congressional purposes. First, it
maintains Congress’s intent that both the
FHSA and the FDCA similarly define “label.”
Second, it furthers the national labeling unifor-
mity Congress mandated through the FHSA.
Requiring companies to place their warnings in
juxtaposition to directions for use directs indi-
viduals seeking such information to a single
location on accompanying literature. The CPSC
recognized this intent in promulgating its reg-
ulations.
One such CPSC regulation, promulgated at
16 C.F.R. § 1500.125, provides that
[w]hen any accompanying literature
includes or bears any directions for use
(by printed word, picture, design, or
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154. Id.
combination thereof), such placard,
pamphlet, booklet, book, sign, or other
graphic or visual device shall bear all
the information required by section
2(p) of the act.155
CPSC recognized this regulation “simply
requires that literature that accompanies a
hazardous substance, and that contains instruc-
tions for use, must bear the cautionary material
required under section 2(p) of the Federal
Hazardous Substances Act.”156 However, this
regulation also implicitly recognizes that if a
placard, pamphlet, booklet, book, sign or other
written, printed, or graphic matter or visual
device used in connection with the substance’s
merchandising does not contain a direction for
use, the statute imposes no such require-
ment.157 The CPSC’s definition identifies what
constitutes “accompanying literature”—i.e.,
any placard, pamphlet, booklet, book, sign, or
other written, printed or graphic matter or visu-
al device—and reaffirms Congress’s intent that
CPSC warnings appear on accompanying liter-
ature in juxtaposition to the directions for use.
CPSC’s subsequent regulations and comments
confirm this understanding.
In 1984, CPSC promulgated 16 C.F.R. §
1500.121, which establishes the “type size and
placement requirements for cautionary materi-
al in accompanying literature.”158 In response to
this regulation, commenters argued 16 C.F.R. §
1500.125 “adequately addresses the subject of
labeling in accompanying literature and that
the proposed requirements should be strick-
en.”159 CPSC, however, noted these commenters
misconstrued 16 C.F.R. § 1500.125’s purpose.
The regulation does require accompanying lit-
erature with “directions for use” to include
FHSA warnings. However, the regulation indi-
cates where to locate these warnings:
[I]f there were not requirements for
placement of the cautionary material,
the cautionary material easily could be
obscured by its placement in the text.
For example, if the instructions for use
appeared on the second page of a ten-page
booklet and the cautionary material appeared
on page ten, the benefit contemplated by the
statute clearly would not be achieved.160
National uniform labeling, including one
location for directions for use and FHSA warn-
ings, constitutes Congress’s intended benefit.
CPSC’s regulations reflect Congress’s
intent that any placard, pamphlet, booklet,
book, sign, or other written, printed or graphic
matter or visual device (i.e., accompanying lit-
erature) that contains directions for use have
FHSA warnings placed adjacent to the direc-
tions for use. As 16 C.F.R. § 1500.125 recog-
nizes, not all accompanying literature will con-
tain such directions for use and need not com-
ply with the “label” requirement to avoid “mis-
branded hazardous substances” status.
Grafting the “directions for use” element into
“accompanying literature,” the California
courts improperly limited the FHSA’s applica-
tion.
Furthermore, “labeling” and “label” are not
interchangeable terms. “Label,” under both the
FHSA and the FDCA, means written, printed or
graphic displays upon the article, while “label-
ing” includes written, printed or graphic dis-
plays either upon any article, its container or
wrappers, or accompanying the article.161 The
1976 Amendment employs “labeling,” not
“label.” The 1976 Amendment, in pertinent
part, provides that
if a hazardous substance or its packag-
ing is subject to a cautionary labeling
requirement under section 2(p) or 3(b)
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156. 49 Fed. Reg. 50,374 (1984) (emphasis added).
157. CPSC defines “accompanying literature” to include
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158. Id.
159. 49 Fed. Reg. 50,374 (1984).
160. Id. (emphasis added).
161. Congress amended 15 U.S.C. § 1261(n) in 1966 to
define “label” for unpackaged articles or articles not packaged in
an immediate container intended for delivery to the ultimate
consumer. The core definition, however, remains the same. 1966
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1521-1522.
. . . designed to protect against a risk of
illness or injury associated with the
substance, no State or political subdi-
vision of a State may establish or con-
tinue in effect a cautionary labeling
requirement applicable to such sub-
stance or packaging and designed to
protect against the same risk of illness
or injury. . . .162
Congress’s amendment identifies each
“cautionary labeling” requirement, e.g., those
found in sections 2(p) and 3(b). These sections
require that “cautionary labeling” requirements
mirror “label” requirements. This is consistent
with Congress’s intent to “provide nationally
uniform requirements for adequate cautionary
labeling.”163 Employing “labeling” rather than
“label” demonstrates Congress’s intent to
extend 2(p) and 3(b) requirements beyond
“label” to include written, printed or graphic
matter accompanying such article.164
Furthermore, it evidences no intent to limit
“cautionary labeling” to accompanying materi-
als with “directions for use.” Congress, howev-
er, failed to define “cautionary labeling.”165
Agencies authorized to enact regulations nec-
essary for a statute’s efficient enforcement give
meaning to words Congress employs.166
The FDA, the FHSA’s previous regulatory
body, recognized the “labeling” and “label”
dichotomy in promulgating its “precautionary
labeling” definition:
Precautionary labeling includes such
information as warnings, registration
or identification numbers, disclosure
of hazards, antidote information, ingre-
dient statements, and other similar
labeling requirements.167
CPSC adopted FDA’s precautionary labeling
definition verbatim.168 Courts presume agen-
cies promulgate regulations with knowledge of
existing laws.169
California courts recognize “point of sale”
warnings are warnings accompanying an article
under the FHSA.170 California courts have graft-
ed a “directions for use” requirement into the
FHSA “label” definition and refuse to recognize
that the FHSA preempts Prop. 65.171 The FHSA
“label” definition, however, neither applies to
written, printed, or graphic material accompany-
ing an article nor encases a “directions for use”
requirement within the definition. “Labeling,”
which Congress uses, includes accompanying
items and also contains no “directions for use”
requirement. In short, the California courts’
“cautionary labeling” definition finds no sup-
port in the FHSA’s legislative history.
2.  A “directions for use” requirement
restricts “labeling” beyond
Congress’s intent.
Additionally, Congress defines “labeling” in
various other statutes,172 including other CPSC
regulated statutes.173 Significantly, no identi-
fied federal “labeling” definition contains a
“directions for use” element. Generally, courts
“give effect to this plain language unless there
is good reason to believe Congress intended
the language to have some more restrictive
meaning.”174 California courts, however, interject
a “directions for use” element into “cautionary
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162. Pub. L. No. 94-284, § 17(a), 90 Stat. 510 (1976)
(emphasis added).
163. 1960 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2833 (emphasis added).
164. 21 U.S.C. § 321(m).
165. See People ex rel. Lungren v. Cotter & Co., 62 Cal. Rptr.
2d 368, 373 (1997); see also Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 860 (1984) (“The
definition in Sec. 302(j) [major stationary source] tells us what
the word ‘major’ means[,] . . . but it sheds virtually no light on the
meaning of the term ‘stationary source.’”).
166. See, e.g., Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34
(1981); Chevron, 467 U.S. 837.
167. 21 C.F.R. § 191.4 (c) (emphasis added).
168. 16 C.F.R. § 1500.7(c).
169. 5 U.S.C. § 557(c).
170. Cotter, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 376.
171. Id.
172. See, e.g., Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and
Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), 7 U.S.C. § 136(p)(2); Federal Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), 21 U.S.C. § 321(m); Poultry and Poultry
Products Inspection Act (PPPIA), 21 U.S.C. § 453(s); Meat
Inspection Act, 21 U.S.C. § 601(p).
173. Congress transferred to CPSC the authority to regu-
lated the FHSA, the PPPIA, and the FDCA. See 15 U.S.C. § 2079. 
174. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 521-22
(1992) (citing Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 97 (1983)).
labeling” that limits “labeling” beyond
Congress’s intent.
Congress requires other industries to
adhere to “labeling” requirements. Congress
defines “labeling” in at least five other
statutes.175 Generally, these statutes’ “labeling”
definitions include two elements, neither of
which is a “directions for use” element. First,
“labeling” includes “label.” This includes all
written, printed or graphic matter on or
attached to the article. Second, “labeling”
includes “written, printed, or graphic matter
accompanying the article.” 
California courts erroneously narrowed
“labeling” by defining it through “label.”
Including “labeling” within “label” rather than
including “label” as a “labeling” subset provid-
ed the California courts with a platform to graft
the “label” “directions for use” requirement
into a “labeling” definition. The California
courts’ definition, however, contradicts
Congress’s “labeling” definition. Congress
includes “label” as a “labeling” subset. By mak-
ing “label” a “labeling” subset, Congress
demonstrates an intent to expand “labeling”
beyond “label” to include items “accompany-
ing” the article, whether or not they contain
directions for use. A CPSC promulgated “cau-
tionary labeling” definition would restore the
appropriate “labeling”-“label” relationship and
correctly overturn the California courts’ erro-
neous interpretation.
The relationship between “label” and
“labeling” in the context of the FDCA was
explained by the United States Supreme Court
in Kordel v. United States.176 In Kordel, the Court
held that written, printed, or graphic informa-
tion which is used in connection with the sale
of a product (such as literature or point of sale
signs), and which “supplements or explains”
the product or its label, should be considered
to be “accompanying” the product and, there-
fore, is “labeling.”177 Furthermore, “[n]o physi-
cal attachment of one to the other is necessary.
It is the textual relationship that is signifi-
cant.”178
C. A CPSC-promulgated “Cautionary
Labeling” Definition Would Restore
Congress’Congress’s Intent.
Congress conveyed sufficient authority to
the CPSC to promulgate a “cautionary labeling”
regulation. Congress intended to “vest
omnibus product safety authority in a single
Federal agency”179 that, among other things,
“develop[s] uniform safety standards for con-
sumer products and . . . minimize[s] conflicting
State and local regulations.”180 Congress
empowered CPSC “to issue regulations, direct
the course of all litigation, and make legislative
and budgetary recommendations, without the
approval or clearance by outside agencies.”181
Indeed, Congress expressly authorized CPSC
“to promulgate regulations for the efficient
enforcement of this chapter.”182
Furthermore, Congress transferred author-
ity to CPSC to implement the FHSA.183 Pursuant
to this authority, CPSC defined “precautionary
labeling” to include “such information as warn-
ings, registration or identification numbers,
disclosure of hazards, antidote information,
ingredient statements, and other similar label-
ing requirements.”184
In 1976, Congress codified the FHSA’s pre-
emptive authority.185 The FHSA’s preemption
clause bars any
State or political subdivision of a State
[from] establish[ing] or continu[ing] in
effect a cautionary labeling require-
ment applicable to such substance or
packaging and designed to protect
against the same risk of illness or
injury unless such cautionary labeling
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175. See supra note 173.
176. 335 U.S. 345 (1948).
177. Id. at 350.
178. Id.
179. United States v. Anaconda Co., 445 F. Supp. 486, 492
(D.C. Cir. 1977) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 92-1153 (1972)).
180. 15 U.S.C. § 2051(b)(3); 16 C.F.R. § 1000.1(a)(3).
181. S. REP. NO. 92-835, at 7 (1972), reprinted in 1972
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4573, 4579.
182. 15 U.S.C. § 1269(a).
183. S. REP. NO. 94-251, at 11 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 993, 1003.
184. 16 C.F.R. § 1500.7; 38 Fed. Reg. 27,012, 27,016 (1973).
185. Pub. L. No. 94-284, § 17(a), 90 Stat. 510 (1976).
requirement is identical to the labeling
requirement under section 2(p) or
3(b).186
CPSC revoked its preemptive regulation but
never altered its “precautionary labeling” defi-
nition.187
Congress’s 1976 codification recognized
CPSC’s right to define cautionary labeling.188
Promulgating a regulation that defines “cau-
tionary labeling” to include “point-of- sale”
warnings that a product can cause cancer or
birth defects falls squarely within CPSC’s earli-
er precautionary labeling definition and both
its current and previously recognized preemp-
tive authority. Indeed, as repeatedly recognized
by the U.S. Supreme Court, a validly promul-
gated federal regulation “has no less preemp-
tive effect [on state laws] than federal
statutes.”189 Furthermore, defining “cautionary
labeling” to include “point-of-sale” warnings
minimizes Prop. 65’s burden and sets a bind-
ing, statutorily supported precedent for other
states. 
Prop. 65 and its progeny undermine CPSC’s
duty to develop uniform national safety stan-
dards for consumer products and minimize
state and local regulations. Congress author-
ized CPSC to maintain uniform national safety
standards to minimize “increased costs to con-
sumers and burden on manufacturers that
could result when States are allowed to main-
tain different standards over and above the
uniform Federal standard.”190 Furthermore, uni-
form national safety standards “facilitate the
education of the public in the cautionary use of
these products . . . [and] enable physicians to
administer antidotes immediately rather than
waste precious time in determining the active
ingredients of the product.”191 Prop. 65 increas-
es manufacturer and distributor costs and
destroys national uniformity.
Prop. 65 primarily obligates producers,
packagers, manufacturers and distributors
(collectively referred to as manufacturers) to
affix special labeling to each consumer product
potentially sold in California if the consumer
product contains chemicals that California
believes causes cancer or birth defects.192
Failure to affix Prop. 65 labels renders FHSA-
compliant manufacturers susceptible to
public and private enforcement suits.193
Manufacturers seeking to avoid such enforce-
ment suits face either the burden of policing
their consumer product’s distribution to avoid
California or the additional costs to affix Prop.
65 labels to all consumer products. Small busi-
nesses lack the resources necessary to individ-
ualize or monitor their product flow into
California. However, defining cautionary label-
ing to include “point-of-sale” warnings, includ-
ing Prop. 65 warnings, eliminates small busi-
nesses’ concerns. Furthermore, including Prop.
65 warnings within “cautionary labeling” does
not eliminate a state’s ability to promulgate
innovative labeling requirements.
Congress recognized that a state’s unique
circumstances may require innovative labeling
programs. Congress exempted a state’s cau-
tionary labeling program if, upon its applica-
tion, the state established that (1) compliance
with the program does not cause the product
to violate CPSC’s requirement; and that (2) the
state program provides a significantly higher
degree of protection than CPSC’s rule affords
and does not unduly burden the product’s
manufacture or distribution in interstate com-
merce.194 Requiring California to submit Prop
65’s labeling program to CPSC scrutiny main-
tains CPSC’s preeminence in consumer prod-
uct labeling, notifies other states considering
similar programs that CPSC reserves the right
to scrutinize their consumer product labeling
programs and guarantees minimal increased
costs to consumers and a lesser burden on
manufacturers.
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187. 47 Fed. Reg. 57,489 (1982).
188. Pub. L. No. 94-284, § 17(a), 90 Stat. 510 (1976).
189. See, e.g., Fidelity Savings & Loan Ass’n v. Del la
Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153-54 (1982) (quoting United States v.
Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 383 (1961)).
190. 15 U.S.C. § 2051(b)(3); 16 C.F.R. § 1000.1(a)(3).
191. 37 Fed. Reg. 18,628 (1972).
192. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25249.6, 25249.11(f)
(West 2000).
193. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25249.7 (West 2000).
194. See 90 Pub. L. No. 94-284, §17, Stat. 510, 11 (1976).
D. Courts Would Sustain a CPSC-promulgated
“Cautionary Labeling” Definition.
Finally, courts should sustain a CPSC-
promulgated “cautionary labeling” definition.
When a court reviews an agency’s con-
struction of the statute which it admin-
isters, it is confronted with two ques-
tions. First, always, is the question
whether Congress has directly spoken
to the precise question at issue. If the
intent of Congress is clear, that is the
end of the matter; for the court, as well
as the agency must give effect to the
unambiguously expressed intent of
Congress. If, however, the court deter-
mines Congress has not addressed the
precise question at issue, the court
does not simply impose its own con-
struction on the statute as would be
necessary in the absence of an admin-
istrative interpretation. Rather, if the
statute is silent or ambiguous with
respect to the specific issue, the ques-
tion for the court is whether the
agency’s answer is based on a permis-
sible construction of the statute.195
Applying this analysis, courts give agency
regulations deferential treatment:
The power of an administrative agency
to administer a congressionally creat-
ed . . . program necessarily requires the
formulation of policy and the making
of rules to fill any gap left, implicitly or
explicitly, by Congress. [Citations omit-
ted.] If Congress has explicitly left a
gap for the agency to fill, there is an
express delegation of authority to the
agency to elucidate a specific provision
of the statute by regulation. Such leg-
islative regulations are given control-
ling weight unless they are arbitrary,
capricious, or manifestly contrary to
the statute. Sometimes the legislative
delegation to an agency on a particular
question is implicit rather than explic-
it. In such a case, a court may not sub-
stitute its own construction of a statu-
tory provision for a reasonable inter-
pretation made by the administrator of
an agency.196
Although opponents of CPSC’s “cautionary
labeling” definition might argue for the appli-
cation of this standard, two courts struck down
a CPSC Advisory Opinion that “point-of-sale”
signs constitute “directions for use.”197 Advisory
opinions, however, differ from formal regula-
tions in two respects. First, courts afford advi-
sory opinions less deference. Second, unlike
the Advisory Opinion, defining “cautionary
labeling” is consistent with Congress’s pur-
pose.
1. Advisory opinions are entitled to lit-
tle deference.
Generally, “courts do not accord Chevron
deference to non-binding advisory opinions of
an administrative agency.”198 According Chevron
deference to advisory opinions effectively
endow[s] them with force of law where
Congress did not intend them to have
such force. By this process, the agency
would bind the public without itself
being bound by interpretations in
these formats. And since these formats
are exempt from A[dministrative]
P[rocedures] A[ct] public participation
requirements, an especially odious
frustration is visited upon the affected
private parties: they are bound by a
proposition they had no opportunity to
help shape and will have no meaning-
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195. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).
196. Id. at 843-44.
197. See, e.g., People ex rel. Lungren v. Cotter & Co., 62 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 368, 382 (1997) (“[W]e find the CPSC’s interpretation is
‘plainly erroneous’ and entitled to no deference.”).
198. Mid-America Care Found. v. National Labor Relations
Bd., 148 F.3d 638, 642 (6th Cir. 1998). See also Crandon v. United
States, 494 U.S. 152 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring); Kilgore v.
Outback Steakhouse, 160 F.3d 294 (6th Cir. 1998); Management
Recruiters Int’l v. Bloor, 129 F.3d 851 (6th Cir. 1997); Southern Ute
Indian Tribe v. Amoco Prod. Co., 119 F.3d 816 (10th Cir. 1997). But
see Elizabeth Blackwell Health Ctr. for Women v. Knoll, 61 F.3d 170
(3d Cir. 1995).
ful opportunity to challenge when it is
applied to them.199
Southern Ute Indian Tribe effectively explains
why courts do not afford advisory opinions
Chevron deference.  In Southern Ute Indian Tribe,
the Southern Ute Indian Tribe (“Tribe”) sued
various defendants, including the Department
of Interior (“Department”), to determine who
owned coal bed methane (“CBM”) contained in
coal the Tribe acquired “as successor in inter-
est to a statutory reservation of coal to the
United States.”200 In finding the Tribe owned the
CBM, the court rejected the Department’s argu-
ment that the court owed Chevron deference to
a 1981 advisory opinion from the Department’s
Solicitor General.201
To satisfy Chevron, the delegation of
authority to form binding policy must
include not only discretion to formu-
late interpretations but also discretion
to utilize the particular format select-
ed. “Chevron should be held to apply
to the meanings agencies give statutes
in all legislative rules and in most
adjudications. [But] it should not be
held to apply to agency pronounce-
ments in less formal formats. . . .”
[Citations omitted.] . . . As we have
unequivocally held, “it is elementary
administrative law that in order for
[agency actions] to have binding force
there are only two methods that an
agency may use in formulating policy.
It may be established binding policy
either through rule-making procedures
or through adjudications that create
binding precedents.” [Citations omit-
ted.]202
Procedural protections required of formal
rulemakings or adjudications but not of advi-
sory opinions explain why courts do not afford
Chevron deference to advisory opinions.
There are three main differences
between a legislative rule and a gener-
al statement of policy. First, except in
specified circumstances, an agency
cannot promulgate a legislative rule
without first following notice and com-
ment procedures; by contrast, APA Sec.
553(b) specifically exempts general
statements of policy from notice and
comment procedures. Second, a valid
legislative rule has the same binding
effect as a statute; a general statement
of policy has no binding effect on
members of the public or on courts. A
general statement of policy also is not
judicially enforceable against an
agency . . . . Third, [while] many leg-
islative rules are subject to potential
judicial review before they are applied
in a particular case[,] most general
statements of policy are not subject to
judicial review in the abstract.203
The Solicitor General’s advisory opinion, the
court recognized, issued without notice or
comment at the Solicitor’s whim, might simi-
larly be overruled, modified or otherwise
altered at the Solicitor’s whim.204 Accordingly,
“[i]f this opinion were accorded Chevron defer-
ence, it would have a retroactive impact on pri-
vate rights conveyed by the government some
seventy years earlier.”205 Therefore, the court
accorded the advisory opinion no deference. 
Similarly, the California courts owed the
CPSC Advisory Opinion no Chevron deference.
First, the timing is questionable. CPSC’s Office
of General Counsel issued its Advisory Opinion
on March 6, 1991, at the Chemical Specialties
Manufacturers Association’s (“CSMA”) request.
The opinion concluded Prop. 65’s warnings
constituted “directions for use.” In December
1991, CSMA argued Prop. 65 warnings consti-
tute “directions for use.”206 The Advisory
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199. Southern Ute Indian Tribe, 119 F.3d at 833.
200. Id. at 819.
201. See id. at 829.
202. Id. at 832.
203. Id. (citing 1 KENNETH C. DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR.,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE, § 6.2, at 228 (3d ed. 1994).
204. See id. at 833.
205. Id. at 830.
206. Chemical Specialties Mfrs. Ass’n, v. Allenby, 958 F.2d
941 (9th Cir. 1992).
Opinion appears calculated to advance CSMA’s
position rather than to suggest a binding inter-
pretation. Second, the Office of General
Counsel issued the opinion without notice or
comment or any other APA-required public
participation.207 As Southern Ute Indian Tribe
noted, “APA Sec. 553(b) specifically exempts
general statements of policy from notice and
comment procedures.”208 Therefore, “[a]s a sim-
ple policy statement . . . the [General
Counsel’s] opinion fail[ed] to provide the pro-
cedural protections required for Chevron defer-
ence to attach.”209 As a result, the California
courts properly accorded it no deference.210
2. Defining “cautionary labeling” is
consistent with Congress’s purpose.
By contrast, courts regularly afford Chevron
deference to agency regulations promulgated
through either APA rulemakings or adjudica-
tions.211 To determine whether a regulation
receives Chevron deference, the court initially
determines whether Congress addressed the
precise question at issue. “When Congress has
not addressed ‘the precise question at issue,’
an agency requesting Chevron deference to its
statutory interpretation must show that it has
been delegated authority to address the ques-
tion.”212 Second, the court must determine
whether the agency construction is “arbitrary,
capricious, or manifestly contrary to the
statute.”213 Chevron demonstrates the quintes-
sential analysis.
In Chevron, the Clean Air Act Amendments
of 1977 (“Act”) required States not attaining the
national air quality standards the EPA estab-
lished to create a permit program regulating
“new or modified major stationary sources.”214
EPA defined the term “stationary source” to
permit existing plants containing several pol-
lution-emitting devices to install or modify
equipment without meeting a state’s permit
requirements so long as the installation or
modification did not increase pollution emis-
sions.215 The Court of Appeals found EPA’s reg-
ulation inconsistent with the Act’s purpose,
but the United States Supreme Court
reversed.216 First, the Court found Congress
failed to address the precise question at issue.
The Court found the Act defines “major sta-
tionary source,” but fails to reference “station-
ary source.”217 Second, the Court found
Congress delegated to the EPA the authority to
“publish a list of categories of sources of pollu-
tion and to establish new source performance
standards (“NSPS”).”218 Finally, the Court ana-
lyzed EPA’s regulation to determine its consis-
tency with the Act’s purpose.
The section has two main purposes:
(1) to allow reasonable economic
growth to continue in an area while
making reasonable further progress to
assure attainment of the standards by
a fixed date; and 
(2) to allow States greater flexibility for
the former purpose that EPA’s present
interpretative regulations afford.219
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208. Southern Ute Indian Tribe, 119 F.3d at 833.
209. Id.
210. Additionally, “cautionary labeling” definition oppo-
nents might argue that the CPSC is without authority to promul-
gate a “cautionary labeling” definition because the California
courts not only rejected the Advisory Opinion’s form, but also
rejected its reasoning. Rejecting the Advisory Opinion’s reason-
ing, however, does not bar CPSC from defining “cautionary label-
ing.” As previously noted, “labeling” as used in the Food, Drug
and Cosmetic Act contains no “directions for use” component.
Therefore, a FHSA “cautionary labeling” definition consistent
with the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act “labeling” definition
should not have a “directions for use” component.
211. See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984); Southern Ute Indian Tribe,
119 F.3d 816.
212. Southern Ute Indian Tribe., 119 F.3d at 816.
213. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844.
214. Id. at 840.
215. See id.
216. See id. at 842.
217. See id.
218. Id. at 846.
219. Id. at 851-52. When Congress passed the Act, EPA
maintained two “stationary source” definitions. One definition
permitted some industries to avoid permit compliance so long as
their total emissions did not increase pollution emissions, and a
second definition required a permit when modifying or installing
new equipment. See id.
The Act’s accompanying Senate Committee
Report found industrial expansion permissible
if a state “demonstrate[s] that these facilities
can be accommodated within its overall plan
to provide for attainment of air quality stan-
dards.”220 Furthermore, the Court found EPA
previously permitted some states to install or
modify facilities without meeting permit
requirements.221 Finally, the Court found EPA’s
regulation comported with the Act’s purpose.
[H]istory plainly identifies the policy
concerns that motivated the enact-
ment; the plantwide definition is fully
consistent with one of those con-
cerns—the allowance of reasonable
economic growth—and, whether or not
we believe it most effectively imple-
ments the other, we must recognize
that the EPA has advanced a reason-
able explanation for its conclusion that
the regulations serve the environmen-
tal objectives as well.222
Therefore, the Court sustained EPA’s regula-
tion.
Similarly, a court would sustain a CPSC
“cautionary labeling” regulation. First,
Congress failed to define “cautionary labeling”
as used in the FHSA.223 Although opponents
might argue the California courts found that
Congress defined “cautionary labeling,”224 the
courts derive this definition from “label.”
Defining “label,” however, does not address the
precise question at issue.225 Indeed, Congress
defines “label” with reference to the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, which separate-
ly defines “label” and “labeling.”226
Second, Congress expressly authorized
CPSC to “promulgate regulations for the effi-
cient enforcement of [the FHSA], except as
otherwise provided in this section.”227 When
Congress failed to define “precautionary label-
ing,” CPSC defined it to include “warnings.”228
Congress has not altered or amended its dele-
gation since 1973.229 Promulgating a current
regulation that defines “cautionary labeling” to
include “warnings” falls squarely within
Congress’s unchanged delegation to CPSC.  
Finally, defining “cautionary labeling” is
consistent with Congress’s intent. Congress
enacted the FHSA
to provide nationally uniform require-
ments for adequate cautionary labeling
of packages of hazardous substances
which are sold in interstate commerce
and are intended or suitable for house-
hold use.
. . . .
The labeling requirements will advise
the user of these hazardous substances
in the use of the product and make
available immediate information for
physicians who are called upon to treat
cases of accidental injury. It should
also provide a pattern which States
may follow in enacting similar legisla-
tion.230
Promulgating a cautionary labeling regulation
that includes “warnings,” including Prop. 65’s
“point of sale warnings,” furthers the FHSA’s
uniform national labeling requirements. First,
it provides a national definition utilized by
both state and federal agencies. This elimi-
nates the potential for differing and/or conflict-
ing definitions promulgated by either courts or
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221. See id. at 857.
222. Id. at 863.
223. 15 U.S.C. § 1261 (2000).
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Allenby, 958 F.2d 941, 949 (9th Cir. 1992).
225. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 860 (“Congress’s ‘major sta-
tionary sources’ definition ‘tells us what the word “major” means
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226. 21 U.S.C. § 321.
227. 15 U.S.C. § 1269. “Past experience shows that unless
the agency has the power to issue regulations, . . . its effective-
ness will be substantially impaired.” 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4573,
4579.
228. 16 C.F.R. § 1500.7(c); 38 Fed. Reg. 27,012, 27,016
(1973).
229. Congress codified CPSC’s preemption regulation in
1976. See Pub. L. No. 94-284, § 17(a), 90 Stat. 510 (1976).
Significantly, nothing suggests Congress altered or eliminated
the “precautionary labeling” definition.
230. 1960 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2833.
agencies. Second, including “warnings” within
“cautionary labeling” establishes a label proto-
type that states might emulate in their
statutes. Including Prop. 65 warnings within
“cautionary labeling” does not eliminate a
state’s ability to promulgate innovative label-
ing requirements as Congress created an
exemption procedure.231 Significantly, CPSC
employed a similar procedure when it included
“warnings” within “precautionary labeling.”232
Courts would sustain a CPSC-promulgated
“cautionary labeling” definition. First, Congress
did not define the term and delegated to CPSC
all authority necessary to implement the FHSA.
Furthermore, a CPSC-promulgated “cautionary
labeling” definition is consistent with
Congress’s desire to create uniform national
labeling. Therefore, a “cautionary labeling” def-
inition, promulgated in accordance with the
APA, is due Chevron deference.
E. CPSC Can Harmonize Congress’s Intent
With California’s Safety Concerns.
Prop. 65 proponents will argue that defin-
ing “cautionary labeling” to include “point-of-
sale” warnings will eliminate Prop. 65 and sim-
ilar state initiatives designed to provide resi-
dents with necessary warning. OSHA, however,
conditionally approved Prop. 65 for California
enforcement without eliminating its intent.233
Likewise, the FHSA permits CPSC to approve
Prop. 65 notwithstanding the FHSA’s preemp-
tive effect.
The FHSA provides the following:
(3)(A) Upon application of a State or
political subdivision of a State, the
Commission may, by regulation prom-
ulgated in accordance with subpara-
graph (B), exempt from paragraph (1),
under such conditions as may be pre-
scribed in such regulation, any require-
ment of such State or political subdivi-
sion designed to protect against a risk
of illness or injury associated with a
hazardous substance if -
(i) compliance with the requirement
would not cause the hazardous sub-
stance (or its packaging) to be in viola-
tion of the applicable requirement
described in paragraph (1), and
(ii) the State or political subdivision
requirement (I) provides a significantly
higher degree of protection from such
risk of illness or injury that the require-
ment described in paragraph (1), and
(II) does not unduly burden interstate
commerce.
In determining the burden, if any, of a
State or political subdivision require-
ment on interstate commerce the
Commission shall consider and make
appropriate (as defined by the
Commission in its discretion) finding
on the technological and economic
feasibility of complying with such
requirement, the geographic distribu-
tion of the substance to which the
requirement would apply, the probabil-
ity of other States or political subdivi-
sions applying for an exemption under
this paragraph for a similar require-
ment, and the need for a national, uni-
form requirement under this Act [this
chapter] for such substance or its pack-
aging.234
This provision permits CPSC to approve Prop.
65 with certain conditions. Permitting out-of-
state Prop. 65 defendants to raise FHSA com-
pliance as an affirmative defense and enabling
the California Attorney General to disapprove
frivolous lawsuits are two necessary conditions
to CPSC approval.
Congress passed the FHSA to ensure
national uniform labeling. Congress recog-
nized national uniform labeling educates the
public that certain products must be used with
caution and permits doctors to administer nec-
essary antidotes without wasted time.
Permitting states to enact their own cautionary
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labeling regimes inhibits Congress’s intent.
Allowing out-of-state Prop. 65 defendants to
raise FHSA compliance as an affirmative
defense protects Congress’s intent and still
allows Prop. 65’s enforcement.
Currently, a Prop. 65 bounty hunter need
only prove that a defendant’s product contains
a chemical known to the State of California to
cause cancer or reproductive toxicity and lacks
the necessary warnings. Compliance with
FHSA’s national labeling standard is no
defense. Allowing out-of-state Prop. 65 defen-
dants to raise FHSA compliance as an affirma-
tive defense, however, supports Congress’s
intent for a national uniform labeling system
and does not prohibit bounty hunters from
enforcing Prop. 65. Indeed, in addition to the
two current requirements, the Prop. 65 bounty
hunter need only prove a Prop. 65 defendant’s
failure to comply with FHSA. Furthermore, it
recognizes Congress’s right to regulate inter-
state commerce235 without infringing upon
California’s right to regulate intrastate com-
merce.
Second, CPSC should require, as a condi-
tion of Prop. 65’s approval under the FHSA, a
provision that provides the California Attorney
General the authority to disapprove frivolous
lawsuits. Currently, California requires bounty
hunters to file 60-day intent-to-sue notices
with the Attorney General’s office. The Attorney
General, however, lacks the authority to bar
those suits its deems frivolous. As a result, all
suits, whether frivolous or not, proceed.
Bounty hunters, however, are essentially
“assistant” attorneys general. As Deputy
Attorney General Ed Weil notes, “If they
weren’t around you’d have to complain more
about me.”236 As “assistant” attorneys general,
Prop. 65 should enable the state to disapprove
those claims deemed frivolous. Approving
Prop. 65 with such requirements empowers the
Attorney General to eliminate frivolous lawsuits.
IV. Conclusion
Congress enacted the FHSA to provide uni-
form national labeling for consumer products.
Congress wanted to ensure consumers
obtained necessary information to alleviate
injuries. By regulating the labels, Congress
eliminated duplicative or unnecessary warn-
ings. Furthermore, by limiting the required
information, Congress increased the possibili-
ty that individuals would discern the material
and use it in an emergency.
Prop. 65 upsets Congress’s intent. It
imposes a duty upon manufacturers doing
business in California to warn in their caution-
ary labeling that California believes certain
chemicals in the product cause cancer or
reproductive toxicity. These additional warn-
ings duplicate the dangers against which FHSA
warnings guard and potentially increase the
cautionary labeling warning’s content.
Assuming each state requires a similar warn-
ing, the potential exists that the cautionary
labeling’s content will be so great that people
will ignore the warnings, fail to read them, or
attempt to read the cautionary labeling but not
find the necessary information in an emer-
gency because the content is too great.
Congress passed the FHSA to preempt
Prop. 65-type statutes. The FHSA warns con-
sumers of possible injuries and dangers a
product presents. Furthermore, assuming
California demonstrates a unique situation
requiring a unique warning, the FHSA enables
California to petition the CPSC and obtain the
necessary approval. CPSC, however, and not
California, should determine the cautionary
labeling’s content. By exercising its FSHA-rec-
ognized authority and promulgating a “cau-
tionary labeling” definition, CPSC can harmo-
nize Congress’Congress’s intent to create
national uniform labeling with California’s
need to protect its citizens. In effect, this
returns Prop. 65 back to the federal labeling
barn.
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